The New
REPUBLIC

December 22, 1941

Our Immediate Task

Those Who Have Failed Must Go

by Michael Straight

Trouble for Admirals . . *William Harlan Hale*

China's Future and Our Own . *Nathaniel Peffer*

The Unity Bandwagon . . . . . *Editorial*

Japan's Strategy—And Resources . *T. A. Bisson*

Labor Goes to War . . . . . *Ben Riskin*

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"THE time has come," the walrus said,
"to talk of many things—
the kind of gifts we ought to give,
and the kind that Christmas brings."

"I'm awfully sick," the Carpenter wept,
"because my gifts are never kept.
And the ones I get I can't abide,
walrus dear, you know I've tried."

They reviewed the problem from every angle,
Until their nerves were all ajangle,
When the Walrus said, with a happy look,
"Why don't we give everyone a book?"

THIS THEY DID, AND WE'RE PROUD TO SAY,
THEIR'S WAS A WONDERFUL CHRISTMAS DAY!

The moral that we here unfold
Is "Buy a book for young and old!"
We'll wrap in gay paper books picked from this list
Or any others that we have missed.

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THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

VOL. 105, NO. 25 NEW YORK, MONDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1941 NUMBER 1412

Secretary Knox Reports

The news from Pearl Harbor, as finally made public by Secretary Knox, is bad enough; but it is far less serious than most Americans had believed. Only one important battleship, the Arizona, was sunk. The Oklahoma was capsized. The Utah, which was sunk, was not part of our fighting strength. Three destroyers and a mine-layer were sunk, and other ships were damaged to an extent requiring repairs that will take from a week to several months. But the bulk of the fleet is intact and is at this moment cruising the Pacific seeking an engagement with the enemy. Secretary Knox said nothing about losses of airplanes, which were undoubtedly heavy, except that the machines destroyed are being replaced. Japan lost three submarines and forty-one aircraft. For the United States, the attack on Pearl Harbor was a defeat but not an overwhelming disaster. The loss of life, however, was heavier than had at first been reported. The navy lost 2,729 killed, and 656 wounded, and the army 168 killed, 223 wounded and 26 missing. Civilian deaths were about fifty.

Once the battle was joined, the Americans fought with great gallantry, but Secretary Knox himself admits that the defending forces were not on the alert and announces an immediate investigation. Final judgment should of course be suspended until that investigation has taken place. The whole conception of the power of airplanes against battleships throughout the world has undergone revision within the past twelve days.

It is not too early, however, to say that some of the blame must lie with civilian government officials in Washington who, until the last minute, followed a policy of appeasement that made adequate war preparations much more difficult. Some of the blame, also, can be charged even this early against the authorities at Pearl Harbor. An American journalist with much war experience was in Hawaii only a few days before the war began. He was shocked to see orderly rows of airplanes drawn up on a flying field, and said so to the officers who accompanied him. When they replied, "Oh, we'll disperse them when the war begins," the journalist's comment was: "Do you expect to get an engraved invitation to go to war some Tuesday night?"

Appeasing the Enemy

One by one the puppet governments of Europe are declaring war upon the United States. Over two, which are fully coöperating with our enemies, the strings have not yet been jerked. The governments of Franco and Pétain have not yet been made to declare war, a fact which should make us excessively alert. Vichy France has openly sided with Japan and obeyed her orders in Indo-China, despite the strongly democratic convictions of the 40,000 Frenchmen in that colony. In Europe, Hitler clearly intends to seize Tunisia, to hold the British at the Mareth Line, to attack the weakened British navy with the French fleet, and to advance upon Dakar. If he succeeds there will be no major field of battle outside of Russia on which his armies may be met and beaten. By taking the Atlantic bases of Portu-

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gal, Spain and Vichy, he will place himself within bombing range of America. To this program, Darlan and Pétain have probably committed themselves in their recent conversations with the Nazis.

We should at once seize Martinique, the Cape Verde Islands and the other bases of the Axis in the Atlantic. Is it conceivable that by dickering with Admiral Leahy, Pétain will succeed in delaying our action until Hitler has struck? Secretary Hull's statement of December 15, in which he expresses "confidence in the French people," is alarming. The French people are not in control of their government. After its monumental lack of realism in dealing with Kurusu, is the State Department still beguiled by the phantom of appeasement?

Eire's Naval Bases

Recent naval losses have set every Allied strategist to thinking out means of compensating for Japan's initial blows. It has been generally concluded that American naval units would be withdrawn from the Atlantic to restore the balance in the Pacific, so weakening the vital Allied line between our Eastern seaboard and Iceland and Great Britain. Mr. de Valera has been quick to see that such a situation may give rise to demands for use of the Irish naval bases: in his speech at Cork he deliberately jumped the gun by reaffirming Eire's neutrality.

Such an attitude is of the utmost gravity today. Eire is one of the few democracies withholding aid in the fight against Hitler. At the same time she is banking on her strategic position to ensure herself of Allied protection. When Mr. de Valera exhorts the men of Cork to be prepared, he is simply making gestures appropriate to his policy. Eire's security depends, now as before, on Britain's survival, which in turn depends upon safety in the Atlantic. By denying to the Allies the use of bases which would greatly increase the range and coördination of naval and air patrols, Eire is doing her part to cut the Atlantic lifeline and her own throat. Now is the time for American pressure to be used in backing demands for Eire's bases.

Civilian Defense Needs a Head

Though the Mayor of New York is a highly talented individual, his strong point has never been an appreciation of the importance of planning and system. No one is better than he at arousing people to action, and in that respect he has contributed much as the head of Civilian Defense. But as a well oiled organization Civilian Defense has been woefully deficient; it has been almost totally lacking in orderly administration. The time has now come when Mr. LaGuardia's combative energy is of little use in this endeavor; he should be replaced by someone who can devote full time to it, and can provide the farsighted coördination needed. The Mayor will be doing well if he can manage in his own city to prevent a repetition of the confusion attending the action of responsible agencies in the first air-raid alarms; that confusion might be disastrous if the enemy really were in the clouds.

Keeping the Balance

In following the war news, the American public should be careful not to indulge in either excessive pessimism or optimism, unwarranted by the facts. In regard to HongKong and the Philippines, for example, it is well to remember that until a few weeks ago, few military experts believed they could possibly be held more than a short time against a Japanese attack, and especially if the enemy were in control of the nearby mainlands. In the case of HongKong in particular, the defensive installations were largely intended to help the morale of the inhabitants and to prevent a surprise attack that would result in the immediate fall of the city. Already, HongKong and the Philippines have held out far beyond the expectations of many observers. Even if both of them were to fall, the Japanese would be a very long way from winning even their segment of the war. Indeed, the superior strength and resources of the democratic powers over those of the Axis would still make final victory overwhelmingly probable, if they are used with the proper energy and intelligence.

If we should not be too pessimistic about possible bad news from the Far East, neither should we be too optimistic about the news from Russia. There is no doubt that the Russian forces are doing a magnificent job against the Germans; but it is also a fact that Hitler's forces have been falling back in order to dig in for the winter. True, they may not be able to stop where they wanted to; true, also, Hitler's time-table has been completely wrecked in spite of the fact that he got within about twenty miles of Moscow. But as things stand today, there is plenty of striking power left in the German army, either for use in Russia in the spring or for an immediate operation through Spain into northwest Africa. If we engage in false overconfidence now, we are helping the enemy.

Enemy Aliens

So far as the treatment of enemy aliens is concerned, the United States and its possessions have been divided into two areas. One area, Guam, the Philippines and Hawaii, becomes the responsibility of the Secretary of War. The continental United States and Alaska are the responsibility of the Attorney General. A number of rules, some disturbingly broad, have been laid down. For example, enemy aliens may not interfere with political activity or seek to influence public opinion. They may not use cameras or short-wave radios or take a plane flight without authorization. They are not to be members of certain organizations which the Attorney General is to name.

Any enemy alien deemed dangerous to the public safety may be summarily arrested, and once arrested he

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will find himself tied up in an enormous bundle of red tape. The arresting agency, it is to be underscored, is the FBI. That organization, since it may arrest on what amounts to the merest suspicion, will have its powers vastly increased. The FBI's record hardly makes for full confidence in the belief that its powers will not be abused. On the other hand, with the memory of fifth-column activities in the rest of the world engraved on all our minds, it is clear that extraordinary powers had to be given to the Justice Department. At the moment we can do little more than hope that enemy aliens will get fair treatment. We must certainly hope that the United States will not repeat the policy of France and Britain, which in general was to lock up anti-fascist refugees while Axis sympathizers went free. There are a number of aliens in this country who certainly have no democratic sympathies. Those are the ones for the FBI to watch.

The Labor-Management Conference

The conference of union heads and representative employers to decide on a means of avoiding interruptions of production during the war is exactly what was needed. Both sides were prompted to take this step by the imminence of drastic legislation which neither approved; the attack on this country by the Axis has immensely reinforced the original motive. Neither side can now afford to take the onus for failure to agree.

The task is in essence a simple one—to suggest a machinery of adjustment and to adopt the broad principles by which it is to be governed. On the question of machinery there is likely to be little disagreement—a tripartite board for mediation or arbitration, which will be voluntary in character because resting on joint consent, and whose decisions will be accepted in advance as final, is obviously what is required. But there may be argument about the principles to underlie the decisions, particularly regarding the status of the closed or open shop, and the question of limitation of wage increases.

Statesmanship is required to discover an acceptable formula on such issues, but the task is far from impossible. Labor cannot be expected to accept the status quo without possibility of modification. Nor can it expect the employers to consent in advance to a universal closed shop or to unlimited wage increases. Within these limits, a *modus vivendi* surely can be found. It goes without saying that not only the vindictive Smith bill, but all other proposed legislation, must be abandoned pending the result of the conference.

Arms for India

For all the news of military victories and defeats which fill the headlines, every new pronouncement of Allied strategy shows the far greater long-term significance of the supply problem. Sir R. K. Shanmukham Chetty, head of the Indian Purchasing Committee, in discussing his country's potential strength, painted a picture of the most dazzling nature, qualifying it with an equally impressive "if." India, he said, cannot only raise an army of four or five million men, she can also equip it—if the United States will supply her with the material essential to a developing industrial economy. India has clothed her present army and given it 16,500,000 units of small arms. With machine tools and special steel from America she can roll out the heavy stuff for a self-contained fighting force of great size.

It is disturbing that this invaluable offer comes at a time when the same need for supplies is the bottleneck in the whole Allied war effort. But we are glad it has been made. Our supply plans can be shaped only on a global scale if we are to prosecute the war in an effective way: supplies for India are as vital to our own strength as they are to the millions who now form the link between the Far East and the Middle East.

Underscored

As it goes to press, The New Republic receives the following note from William Harlan Hale, author of the article, "Trouble for Admirals," which appears elsewhere in these pages. Mr. Hale comments:

"Secretary Knox's report on our losses at Pearl Harbor, made on Monday afternoon, completes the picture which my article had to leave unfinished. It corrects my article in one respect; it now appears that we were not, after all, the first nation to sink a battleship with a bomb. Captain Kelly's feat of destroying the Haruna was preceded by the even greater Japanese feat of dropping a bomb directly down the Arizona's smokestack. This does not change the naval lessons of the fateful week, it merely underscores them."

Last Week

Seventy-two hours after the Japanese bombers and submarines had spread death at Hawaii, the war formally became the Second World War. Germany and Italy declared war on the United States on December 10. President Roosevelt's message to Congress on Thursday, December 11, said: "The forces endeavoring to enslave the entire world are now moving toward this hemisphere." The fact was indisputable. There was no dissenting voice.

The provision of the Selective Service Act forbidding the use of United States troops outside the Western Hemisphere was canceled without discussion. People talked about the unreadiness of the navy at Pearl Harbor and awaited that process of replacement of peacetime military leaders by the unknowns whose right to command will be disclosed through the fighting. As the week went on it was evident that there was plenty of fight in the navy, in the Marines on Wake Island and in General MacArthur's regulars and Filipinos. FDR was speaking quietly and his jaw was out at the old angle. People spoke of that, grinned a little themselves and went to work.

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For a Unified Command

WHAT IS THE ACTION most necessary to win this war, in addition to those things we are doing or already planning to do? Is it to reinforce Singapore? Is it to attack the Japanese in their home waters, or to induce the Soviet Union to move against them from Siberia and place air fields at our disposal? Is it to hold HongKong and the Philippines? Or is it to divert our major strength to the Atlantic, or possibly to the Mediterranean? And if so, which objective should we seek in Europe or Africa? Amateur strategists—and professional ones too—are offering many theories. But there is one consideration which stands out above all others. Whatever course it may be best to choose, there is at the moment nobody in a position to choose it or to execute it when chosen. Our strategists cannot act intelligently without unified action with the British, the Chinese, the Russians and the Dutch. Victory demands a united plan and a concentration of forces. A world war cannot be fought successfully without a world strategy and a world command.

It is true that the Soviet Union has just presented the democratic Allies with a magnificent victory. Hitler promised his people that Moscow would be taken and the Russian armies crushed before winter; instead, Moscow stands, Rostov has been recaptured, and the Germans are retreating. The retreat may even be a rout, as the Russians assert. Yet even Napoleon's retreat from Moscow did not end his power of aggression. And it is quite possible that the German army can, by assuming the defensive in the Soviet Union during the winter, hold a prepared line and still spare a million men, with their equipment and a large number of planes, for use in another quarter.

Where will Hitler strike next? As usual, there are a number of possibilities, and it is difficult to know certainly what will happen before the advance begins. It has been predicted that he will renew the submarine campaign in the Atlantic with greater fury, in the hope that naval reinforcements must be sent to the Far East by both Britain and the United States. This might be followed by another air blitz on Britain and an invasion in the spring. The possibility is sufficient to keep the British from undertaking a major offensive.

There were rumors a while ago (quite possibly set afloat by Dr. Goebbels for the purpose of confusing the issue) that the Germans were preparing to strike through Turkey, for a back-door assault on the oil wells of Baku. Hitler's petroleum reserves may be running low; the Russians announced recently that they were sufficient only to last two months more. If that is so, it would seem essential for the German war machine to get to the sources of oil before spring. Another possible route is to bypass Turkey with an attack on Syria, aimed in the end at Irak and Iran. Both routes might be attempted at once. For a long time the British have been preparing for possible action in this direction. And we have been helping them with supplies shipped to the Near East.

If an oil shortage is not immediately threatening, Hitler's best opportunity would seem to be to occupy French and Spanish North Africa, using the French fleet to protect his communications from Europe and to shut off the Mediterranean at its western end. The Spanish and French governments evidently are prepared to aid him in such an endeavor. The advantages of this move would be many. It would hamper, if not destroy, any British resistance in Asia Minor, Egypt or Libya, because of the difficulty of sending reinforcements and supplies. If at the same time Japan could capture Singapore and cut off access to these regions from the east, the pincers would be set. Hitler could also move into West Africa and Dakar, threatening us in South America. Finally, without North Africa as a base, the Allies would be deprived of any future opportunity to invade the Axis nations, provided Russia were knocked out of the war in later campaigns. And Hitler would have his oil.

No one of the Allies alone can be sure of checkmating any of these plans. The Russians could help immensely either by continuing their offensive against the Germans or by attacking Japan. It is probable that they cannot do both at once, even if their remaining resources are sufficient to do either effectively without a rest period.

The British Libyan campaign, though it has gained territory, has failed in its aim to annihilate quickly the Axis armies in Africa. Even if it drives them back through Tripolitania, it will meet strong defenses on the border of Tunisia, which Hitler could probably hold with a relatively small force while he consolidated his position. The ability of Turkey to withstand an all-out Axis offensive is uncertain, and the British Imperial forces between the Mediterranean and Irak are none too powerful. Meanwhile we have our hands full, together with the British and the Dutch, in containing Japan's southward thrust.

Separate and uncoördinated action on all these fronts will allow Hitler to exploit to the full the initiative which still remains in his hands and the advantage of his central position. He will be allowed the choice of the main battlefront, and he may be able to mobilize in it stronger forces than any which could be brought against him. United strategy and command might, on the contrary, seize the initiative from him, or at least meet him with equal force on any field on which he chooses to concentrate.

Such unified strategy would, for instance, on the basis of all the information available to it, decide whether with safety the Allies could attempt merely to contain a German offensive this winter while they strove to knock Japan out of the war, or whether on the contrary they would have to assume the defensive

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against Japan while they prevented Hitler from improving his position further. On that judgment would depend the allocation of navies, armies, air forces, shipping and supplies.

The British and American navies and air forces together, especially if Russian help were available, could make Japan pay the penalty for her extended position and carry the war into her home bases. On the other hand, they could hold the Mediterranean, immobilize or destroy the French fleet, and prevent any German penetration of Africa in force, while continuing to protect Atlantic shipping. American soldiers could reinforce the British either in the Far East or in Africa, with the proper allocation of shipping and naval protection; but there are probably not ships enough to do both at once. Or they might release enough of the British from home defense so that the British army could undertake a major offensive. Meanwhile Russian power could be used where it would count most.

In the last war there was no unification of command on the western front until the last year of hostilities, when the Germans had almost won. This time we may, if we will, learn from that experience. But the lesson must be applied quickly and on a far greater scale, if we are not to make costly and perhaps irretrievable mistakes. Even an inferior plan, if followed with coherence and energy, is better than a planless dispersion of forces.

The Unity Bandwagon

THE NEW BANDWAGON is national unity. All sorts of people are getting on it—those who once blew the trumpets of America First, those who played cunningly the modulations of appeasement, the siren tongues that whispered peace where there was no peace, the stentorian voices that called majestically for perfecting democracy at home before we adventured abroad, those who loudly invoked some wave of the future to wash America's shores, the serpents that hissed defamations of everything forward-looking in American life. You can hear them all now in the new Bandwagon Symphony of a unified America.

Where unity is genuine it is the most precious possession a nation can have. No one in his right mind would scorn it or be anything but thankful for it. And much of our new-found unity is indeed genuine. That is one of the achievements for which Mr. Roosevelt will rank high in the history of the American presidency. He had the choice during the past year of pushing the war issue and assuming the great risk of leading a disunited nation into war, or of taking realistically the defense steps that had to be taken without alienating the middle-of-the-road groups in America. He chose the latter course, and his choice has been vindicated by events. As a result the vast mass of the honest if misguided isolationists solidly support the nation's war effort.

But there is a difference between these honest isolationists and the cautious middle-of-the-roaders who could only be convinced by the iron logic of events, on the one hand, and on the other the climbers on the bandwagon whom we have described above. The first sought the light, if in a bat-blind way; the second have increasingly ranged themselves behind the powers and principalities of darkness. With the first we have the common ground of a belief in democracy and a stake in it, whatever our past divergences as to tactic; while the second have placed between us and them the miasmal distance of their contempt for democracy and their stake in the emergence of a new barbarian elite that (they hope) will inherit the earth.

They are not to be trusted. The whole crazy congeries of them—Christian Front, America First, Christian Mobilizers, Coughlinites, Women United, Mobilizers, Vindicators, Silver Shirts—along with their allies, their apologists, their innocents' fronts, their transmission belts, are not to be trusted for one moment beyond the echoing emptiness of their new-found patriotism. Give them a chance as citizens of America to prove the genuineness of their new zeal, yes. But never for a moment give them positions of trust or responsibility, or pay any heed to their counsels. They have been wrong all this time—criminally wrong if it was intentional, tragically wrong if it was not. Those who told us we need not fear Hitler or Japan, those who said America could not be attacked, those who said we could do business with Hitler, those who preached and practised defeatism and appeasement and hatred—by what alchemy has the war turned their fantastic dross of the past into the golden metal of the future?

Before Japan struck they said this was not our war. After Japan struck they changed their tune. "Lick Hell out of the Japs," they said, "but do nothing to help the perfidious English or to uphold the bloody hand of Stalin." Unfortunately their new party line lasted only from Sunday to Tuesday. On Tuesday the declaration of war by Berlin and Rome caught them with their metapolitics down.

We shall still have to reckon with them. To be sure, many of their organizations are now being dissolved. That is true of their most important organization, America First, which before the outbreak of the attacks on America had become the polarizing agent of the anti-democratic forces. But while America First has dissolved and the Christian Front may dissolve, the economic, political and psychological elements of which they were formed are still with us. The morbid Roosevelt-hatred is still with us. The bitter Anglophobia, the Russia-baiting, the labor-baiting, the anti-Semitism, the racism, the disbelief in democracy, the religious fanaticism, the hatred of aliens, the respect for Nazism, the fundamental contempt for the common man and his potentialities—these are still with us.

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And we must expect that they will be at work, above ground or underground, during the months and years to come. Every military reverse we suffer, every casualty list that is issued, every instance of price inflation or war profiteering, of capitalist chaos or bureaucratic ineptitude or labor unrest, will be made use of by those who have in the past stood for the attitudes we have enumerated. This is what Roosevelt brought us to, we will be told: this is what the Britishers have done, this is what the Jews have done, this is what comes of trying to save the Communists. And in the confusion of the post-war period, there will not be lacking those who will capitalize on the hesitations and divided counsels for which they have themselves been responsible.

What to do? First of all, we must understand clearly what has happened, and refuse to accept a surface unity for the genuine thing. That means vigilance—democratic vigilance but none the less vigilant. Second, we must drive ahead with the war effort and later with the task of the peace without paying heed to the counsels of these groups. Third, in the coming congressional elections we should look back on the record of the past eighteen months, and return congressmen or not return them according to a stringent reading of that record. Not the clangor of words but the reality of the record is what we must rely on as a base for a genuine national unity.

What About Russia?

IN THE FIRST week of the war, Hitler has attacked the United States. He has attacked us, not by an air raid but by a rumor with which he hopes to force a wedge between America and her new allies. The rumor is that he has made a deal with Russia through which Russia will remain at peace with Japan.

Hitler has launched this attack at the height of Russia's tremendous advance against the Nazis. After five months of fighting, in which Russia has suffered losses greater than any other nation could survive, she has beaten the German armies within sight of Moscow.

Hitler may well have offered the Russians immunity from Japanese attack if they would permit him to transfer a part of his armies to the African front without exploiting his withdrawals. The Russians have replied by pursuing and destroying the Germans from Leningrad to Taganrog.

Yet the rumors of a Russian deal with Germany have been allowed to spread. "These ugly little hints," the President said, "fly thick and fast in wartime." They have flown so fast that Litvinov and Hull have been compelled to deny them in simultaneous notes. In Congress it was proposed two days after the Japanese attack that all shipments of lease-lend supplies be cut off from Russia unless she undertook a further exertion against Japan. This proposal was also advocated in The New York Times. What could be more helpful for Hitler? His immediate objective in bringing Japan into the war was undoubtedly to divert to the Pacific the increasing flow of American and British supplies to Archangel.

Why is it that so far the Russians have held their Far Eastern armies out of the war, when all of the Axis forces are employed against the Allies? Many American experts believe that between 200,000 and 300,000 Russian troops were perhaps transferred from Siberia to the Caucasian front. While 800,000 Russian soldiers may remain, they face a Manchurian army of at least 300,000 men. This army is well equipped, and sufficiently self-sustaining to undertake a strong offensive against the Russians without greatly depleting Japanese supplies. Once again Russia would bear the brunt of the fighting, yet it is believed that she is already risking war by negotiating with America for the use of air bases in the Maritime Provinces and port facilities at Vladivostok.

So long as the Russian power is concentrated against Hitler, our means of engaging the Japanese army must be by reaching and equipping the Chinese army of 4,000,000 men. The Burma Road is threatened now, but a far shorter road to Chungking lies waiting to be opened. It runs from Canton. Already the Chinese armies are advancing upon Canton, and from the sea the Japanese are attacking the nearby British base of HongKong in an effort to keep the road closed. As soon as we recover sufficient strength to take the initiative, Canton may be our first objective.

Meanwhile we need to silence Hitler's "ugly little hints" in America. Russia has fought magnificently against our common enemy; she is fighting magnificently now. So long as she continues to fight, she will remain our strong and admired ally.

THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

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Trouble for Admirals

If our American admirals were unhappy after their first week of war, so were those of the other fighting nations. From the strictly naval point of view, the first round was a disaster for all concerned. Everything happened that should not have happened. A great deal of explaining was in order, and the opposing high commands had to face the fact that if air attacks continued to destroy their fleets at the rate established during the first seven days of conflict, soon they might not have any fleets.

The veil, when this was written, was still drawn tightly about the Pearl Harbor affair. But some things happened subsequently which were no less amazing. They raised equally embarrassing questions as to what might befall the sailors next. All of them revealed—to put it mildly—a disturbed state of mind. Each threw someone's strategy completely out of kilter; each severely rocked the naval boat.

First: it was the British, we know, who at Taranto showed the world the ruinous effectiveness of aerial torpedoes when fired at unprotected battleships; it was also the British who showed, during their brilliant sweeps of the Mediterranean, the importance of always attaching a watch-dog aircraft carrier to their own battleships. It should not have happened, therefore, that when the British sent their new and precious Prince of Wales into Jap-infested waters, they gave her no air support at all, and abandoned her to the inevitable attack of torpedoes.

Second: it is the Japanese who, possessing perhaps twice as many carriers in the Pacific as we do, have most stressed the need of combining control of the air with all ventures at sea. It should not have happened, therefore, that when two of their battleships were assisting the extremely hazardous landing operations on the island of Luzon, they were left so inadequately covered by planes that American bombers knocked them out.

Third: it is the Americans who, possessing the world's greatest stock of pre-1914 battleships, have most consistently laughed off the possibility that such battleships might be sunk by bombs. For the sake of naval "face," therefore, it should hardly have happened that the first man in history to sink a battleship with bombs should have been an American. (The Prince of Wales, along with the American battleship admitted lost at Pearl Harbor, may have been damaged by bombs; but they were sunk by torpedoes—which is a very different matter.)

Fourth: the only upset which caused no surprise was that of the two Italian cruisers which seem to have gone down before a small batch of British destroyers. But even this was distinctly a "first" in history: destroyers have never yet been able to charge in with gunfire and sink ships that were twice or three times their size and strength. Distinctly, from the Italian point of view, it should not have happened.

Now, each of these occurrences has had a sudden and—I venture to say—a rather convulsive effect upon the map-gazing and head-scratching operations called "grand strategy." Again, the trouble at Pearl Harbor had better be passed over in silence, until more facts are published. But the meaning of the breaking of the strongest part of Britain's Singapore squadron is clear enough: it robs Britain of the chance to throw main strength against the sea communications by which Japan feeds her land attack upon Burma and Malaya; it releases one or two Jap battleships from their Indo-China station; it opens Singapore to possible blockade by sea. A considerable force of British Asiatic ships does remain; working together with the highly efficient Netherlands Indies squadron, Britain's ships would form a compact fleet; but still—until the arrival of new capital ships from home—they would probably not be in a position to hazard a frontal attack upon the Japanese.

Meanwhile, though, Japan's victory over Britain's heavy ships has itself been virtually nullified. Any heavy units which the Japanese hoped to draw back into their main fleet after they were no longer needed to guard Indo-China now have had to be sent to the Philippines instead, to replace the lost Haruna and her reportedly crippled sister ship. At war's outbreak Japan probably had twelve battleships (including a remilitarized training ship); yet, with her extended lines and commitments, it is doubtful today whether she can mass more than six in her home fleet. Thus, even if the greater part of the damage the Japanese say they inflicted at Pearl Harbor were revealed to be true, Japan's big-fleet advantage would be tenuous indeed, and likely to be upset as soon as reinforcements arrived from the Atlantic.

The American success at bombing a battleship may be minimized by some of the braided oracles on our retired list with the statement that the victim, the Haruna, was after all an old and thinly armored vessel. So she was: or rather, she was thinly armored on her sides. On her decks, however, the Japanese constructors some years ago had taken the precaution of adding some 3,000 tons of 4-inch steel to her original protection against falling shot. She was by no means so well protected as our later American ships, but neither was she scantily clad. Her destruction emphasized with exclamation points the lesson brought home by the loss of the Prince of Wales a day before, namely: battleships must under no circumstances be allowed to

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thrash about in troubled waters unless plenty of aircraft can be sent aloft on a moment's notice to protect them.

That means that your battleships are no good to you unless you have the aircraft carriers to go with them. This is terrible news to surviving admirals of the mental vintage of Winfield Scott Schley. Yet no dispraise of battleships as such is implied in it. The battleship remains the incomparable sea-keeping hard-slugging mainstay; but the British, who have a way of teaching others before they learn themselves, have shown that even offensively the battleship functions best when working with a carrier that finds and nails its prey: remember the hunting and sinking of the Bismarck.

But this in turn means that you must have plenty of carriers. And nobody has plenty of carriers. In relation to the extant number of carriers, there is a veritable surfeit of battleships about the world. The three leading sea powers average two battleships per carrier; but since last week probably every admiralty wishes it had a carrier per battleship. From now on even a certain amount of unemployment may descend upon the superdreadnought family, until its members are equipped with at least makeshift or auxiliary carriers. Here, then, is a strategic bottleneck. It is also a production and a tactical bottleneck: for the aircraft carrier is extremely complex to build, extremely involved to train and extremely easy to sink.

In one nation, however, the carrier quandary is reversed. That is Germany. Hitler seems to have two carriers in commission, but he has only one battleship (the Tirpitz) which at present is in a fit state to accompany them. The supposition is being made, therefore, that one German carrier is now operating with the Japanese, and providing them the invaluable aid of a fast, brand-new, forty-plane ship. A pocket-battleship and some Nazi merchant raiders may also be working in the South Pacific. If we have underestimated Japanese strength, it is in part because we have failed to take account of the aid Germany can give her.

The fourth event of the week—the claimed sinking of two Italian cruisers by British destroyers, and of a third cruiser by a submarine—will also react heavily upon sea strategy. If these losses are true (and British naval claims in the past have proved to be fairly accurate), they will reduce Italy's cruiser strength to thirteen, of which several ships are reported to be in disrepair; and they will still further dispirit the Italian crews, who by now have had plenty of time to become convinced of the general incompetence of their commanders.

It has been apparent since early fall that the Axis by degrees was losing control of its vital supply lanes to Libya; with each new Italian failure the British strokes have become more bold; today, having lost probably seventy merchant ships in transit, Hitler cannot hope to succor his African troops with Mussolini's feeble help alone. Since he cannot bring his own surface ships in through Gibraltar, he is soon going to be forced to insist upon getting the Vichy fleet which Pétain so far has withheld from him. Last week's fresh losses may have brought the Führer much nearer to his decision.

When and if Hitler gets the French fleet, however, the naval effects will be worldwide. The larger part of the British home fleet, now on northern sentry-go, will be rushed to the Mediterranean; American ships, it may be presumed, will relieve it. The chances of a major naval clash in the Mediterranean will rise at once; and (since neither France nor Italy now commands a single aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean) so will the chances of a final British victory in that sea. Meanwhile the American forces which now stand immobilized about the Caribbean, watching the devious moves at Guadeloupe and Martinique, will be enabled to close in, to overpower the Vichy ships stationed at those islands, and then move on to action elsewhere. What fate Dakar might meet, or whether an American force next might reach into the slippery Azores, can only dimly be surmised.

A sinking at one point, another five thousand miles away—they seem isolated instances, but they are all interlocked. The oceans are continuous; a tilt in the scales here throws off the whole balance around the world. And in spite of what is written about the immensity of navies, the ships on which their power rests are but a few score in number—"so vast in themselves," Winston Churchill described them, "yet so small, so easily lost to sight on the surface of the waters." It was said of Admiral Jellicoe that he was the only man in a position to lose the whole world war in an afternoon; smash another Japanese battleship tomorrow off Luzon, and it might cost the war lords of Tokyo their entire plan of campaign.

WILLIAM HARLAN HALE

Prophecy

How much the slow, dead wind
Barters to the taste of summer,
Only treatises of ice foretell.
Lapping up the summer on its tongue,
The winter bird has commerce to consider.

Flying South is more than kind
Or unkind: it is the summer—
Ransomed space, the peer's tableau
Of bird on air, storming shingled sun:
Those random wings never speak of snow.

HOWARD MOSS

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Japan's Strategy—And Resources

THE OPENING PHASES of the Pacific war, grimly repetitive of the Axis pattern in Europe, have drastically altered the immediate strategic outlook in the Far East. A bold and aggressive initiative, seconded by treacherous surprise and effective execution, has won even more than its normal quota of advantages. If we would turn the shock of this initial blow to good account, we must examine its effects and appraise the resulting situation as realistically as possible.

Up to the moment that Japan struck, it is clear that American estimates of the Far Eastern military-naval problem, whether by amateurs or experts, had leaned toward an optimism that has proved unjustified. Our analyses were thrown awry by the unlooked-for revelation of amazing defensive unpreparedness on one side and uncannily efficient offense on the other. This brutal demonstration now enters into our calculations as an important factor, hitherto unsuspected. If the proper lessons are drawn, including not only adequate precautions against further surprises but the need for a much vaster military-naval effort than was previously anticipated, it becomes useless to repine over these opening incidents of the war.

The incidents cannot be thereby dismissed, however, for the "serious setback" to which the President referred, since made even more serious by the loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, has determined the strategic pattern of at least the first period of the Pacific war. It is a pattern wholly different from that which had been confidently expected.

In the mid-Pacific, the American battle fleet has been placed strictly on the defensive for some weeks or months. At the outset it was well below full strength, since much of the fleet had been transferred to the Atlantic, and the losses at Pearl Harbor have further reduced its already limited striking power. Out beyond Hawaii, it is probable that Guam—which Congress would not consent to fortify—is lost; the small detachments on Wake are making a gallant struggle, but against forces that may prove overwhelming. It remains to be seen whether both Wake and Midway Islands will not be lost and have to be recovered in later operations.

Until American reinforcements reach Pearl Harbor, therefore, the Hawaiian fleet presents no threat to Japan's home waters or her expeditionary forces. One whole side of the naval problem with which Japan would normally have to reckon has been screened off and can be ignored for at least the early period of the war. On this basis, Japan's High Command has turned with full energy to Southeast Asia, where it is deploying its greatest strength.

Here, too, the initial engagements, both military and naval, have found the Japanese waging a vigorous offensive, despite their lengthy lines of communication. Allied forces in Malaya and the Philippines, thrown back on the defensive, have proved unable to launch effective attacks on Japan's sea lanes into Southeast Asia. Indo-China, Thailand and Hainan Island have been made, temporarily at least, secure advance bases for the operations against Malaya and the Philippines. Almost overnight the Japanese forces have placed themselves within striking distance of vital objectives at Singapore and Manila. All energies, on the Allied side, have been diverted to the overriding task of defending these objectives. Allied blows against the bases of the Japanese attack, even bombing raids on nearby Indo-China or Formosa, have not been made.

These are the negative aspects of the new strategic picture that has emerged in the Pacific, after barely a week's operations. It differs immensely from the pre-December 7 concepts of Southwestern Pacific strategy, all of which stressed Anglo-American-Dutch air superiority in the South China Sea, the vulnerability of Japan's sea communications and the difficulty of Japanese landing operations on hostile coasts. On the other hand, there is no reason for concluding, from the facts now available, that the Japanese will upset these forecasts in every respect. The difficulties Japan's landing attempts are encountering in the Philippines, and the naval losses Japan is beginning to suffer, are possible straws in the wind. At any rate, a bitter struggle lies immediately ahead in Southeast Asia.

Our first task now is to make good the defenses of Singapore and the Philippines until naval and air reinforcements in sufficient strength to redress the balance can be sent into the Pacific. There is no reason to entertain wholly pessimistic conclusions as to the outcome of this first round. Anglo-American naval superiority to the Axis-Japan combination, on a global basis, still exists, and the proper allocations of ships can be made. Air reinforcements are less immediately available, but will soon prove overwhelming—especially when contrasted with Japan's estimated total strength of some 5,000 or 6,000 planes and production capacity of 250-300 per month. For quick availability, moreover, it should be noted that Australasia and India, themselves growing producers of heavy munitions, are the closest areas of support to Southeast Asia.

Japan, moreover, is crucially dependent on a swift victory. Her first successes, great as they are, mean relatively little if Singapore stands and the oil of the Dutch East Indies is unattainable. The gains already achieved will almost certainly prolong the Pacific phase of the world war. Unless Russia, too, enters the lists

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against Japan, the prospect of a short war (a war of six months' duration, for example) has disappeared, along with other previous conceptions of what was to occur in the Pacific. But even if the Soviet Union stays out—by no means a foregone conclusion—Japan still faces a contest that will become increasingly difficult as time passes. A failure to win the Malayan-East Indian resources would not be immediately fatal, but it would seal the ultimate decision. It would blunt Japan's sword and turn the result over to relative productive capacities.

In this field, as a cautionary emphasis, the result cannot be expected to work out quickly. American-British-Soviet production has to cover the needs of a global war—of the war against Hitler and his European allies, as well as against Japan. No strategic plans can now be drafted on any other basis. Only a definite portion of the ships, guns and aircraft on hand, and of those now coming off production lines, can be allotted to the Pacific. Hitler's maneuvers in Europe—particularly those involving France and French Africa—may present extraordinary demands at given moments that will further reduce the Pacific quota. But if the result does not come quickly, it will come none the less surely. (A rapid concentration of overwhelming forces, and an all-out offensive, would prove by far the most economical and effective strategy against Japan, and should not be wholly excluded from consideration even now.) The capacity of American production forms but one factor in this long-term equation. No less important is the Anglo-American-Soviet predominance in raw materials.

On both these counts, Japan is infinitely weaker than Germany. Her industrial base—thanks to the boom trade of 1937-40 carried on with her current opponents—has expanded considerably since the war with China began at Marco Polo Bridge in July, 1937. But this industrial base is still of second-rate order, measured by the economic giants of present-day Germany or the United States. Across the face of Europe, Germany has taken over new centers of advanced industry and geared them into her war economy. For Japan, there are no comparable industrial areas to be seized in the Far East. And she can get machine tools from neither Germany nor the United States. Her industrial plant cannot be refitted but will steadily deteriorate.

Raw-material shortages constitute an even more serious handicap to Japan. As early as 1939 industrial production in Japan, affected also by the growing lack of skilled labor, began to decline. In 1940-41, with first a limited and then a full embargo, the curve fell more sharply. Ores and metals, even more than oil, were lacking. The scarcity was to some degree artificially produced—through an effort to hoard supplies against a future emergency need by the war industries. Absolute shortages have probably not developed yet in any of the strategic materials, but they will certainly appear—and will prove determining—in a long war.

Japan has begun her campaign, it can hardly be questioned, with abundant stocks of finished munitions. Her oil reserves are large—nothing less than a mechanized land war in Siberia added to the present naval conflict would empty her storage tanks quickly. Food supplies are probably adequate, especially if the rice of Indo-China and Thaland can be safely transported to Japan. This supplies an answer to the problem of morale, buttressed further by striking victories at the outset. With her extensive merchant marine called in from the seven seas, there is an abundance of army transports and supply vessels. A question mark commonly placed against Japanese aviation would appear to have been thoroughly erased. Planes and tanks are quantitatively few—at least compared to European standards—but this shortcoming, again, would only be critical if infantry had to be equipped for intensive warfare on a vast scale.

In sum, Japan is equipped to strike powerful blows, and to keep striking for a lengthy period, if only the quantitative demands on her productive equipment are not abnormally heavy. Many foes and many fronts can exhaust her quickly; fewer foes will require a longer time, especially if they are not willing to risk a large concentration of power. But a long war of itself will ultimately spell exhaustion to Japan if the embargo is not broken through. Of all countries, Japan is the most vulnerable to blockade. She is surrounded, denied access to the machinery and raw materials of friend (Germany) and foe (United States, British Empire, East Indies). She cannot, like Italy, be shored up by Germany. If she does not break through to raw materials, the scissors of the production curves—rising Anglo-American, declining Japanese—will inexorably widen to her doom. Will the first sharp blows of the sword carve out a path to iron, oil, rubber and tin? If not, Japan will prove the weakest link in the Axis—the link that may well break first. And, if the conditions to make it possible are met, Japan can still be rolled up quickly enough to release the forces that will encompass Hitler's final destruction in Europe.

T. A. BISSON

As Taut in Wonder as the Moon

To Nature bound, for joy or grief;
In Nature barred with every sense;
With her eye seeing only her,
With her breath only, asking Whence;
With spider art and diffidence;
Mole behind two rays of sight,
A transport of marauding sense,
Flame of flame and night of night,
Men wander through the elements
To Nature bound, for joy or grief;
As taut in wonder as the moon,
Divine of being as the leaf.

TOM BOGGS

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China's Future and Our Own

THE BOMBS that fell on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7 marked not only the beginning of a war but the logical conclusion of a chapter of American history and of Far Eastern history. The circumstances out of which the war with Japan arose make clear with almost textbook simplification what this war is and why. They illuminate the past and can serve as a beacon for the future.

There is an almost artistic unity in the Far Eastern war, unity as well as historical continuity. The point of unity is the fate of China, with the ultimate division on that point America versus Japan. With all the divagations, divigations caused by special and transitory conditions, so it remained at the end, when Japan made its last desperate cast. On China the break came, and it came between Japan and the United States.

So it has been for almost forty years. There might be times when Japan was arrayed against Russia, and they seemed about to go to war, as recurrently between 1933 and 1939. There might be times when Japan was arrayed against Great Britain, as for example in 1938, when the Japanese blockaded the British Concession and humiliated British subjects. And yet, in the end the tensions have always resolved themselves into a confrontation of the United States and Japan, whatever nations were in dispute in the first instance.

It might be that Japan was threatening Siberia or Mongolia or Indo-China or the Dutch East Indies or Thailand or Pacific islands; but somehow each contested territory became tributary to China and the conflict over its disposition subordinated to the disputed status of China. And then, sooner or later, America was found in the vanguard, however indirectly concerned it might be in the intrinsic merits of the originating issue.

Consider the events antecedent to the attack on Pearl Harbor. In 1937 Japan invaded China. At first America took no active part. It may be forgotten now —and perhaps should not be—that in October of that year President Roosevelt made his "quarantine" speech urging the necessity of outlawing aggressor nations. It was a kind of trial balloon to test American public opinion; it fell flat. The country was still firm in isolationist resolve, the Neutrality Act its reliance for exemption from war. Thereafter the United States relapsed into a kind of negative role in the China-Japan war. While benevolently neutral toward China, it was unwillingly but effectually helping Japan by selling to her the raw materials that were converted into arms and munitions by means of which half of China was overrun. There was an almost audible sigh of relief from Japan. The Japanese, especially after the sinking of the Panay, punctiliously avoided any offense to Americans in the Far East.

Russians and British were the villains in the Japanese propaganda piece. Armed clashes between Russian and Japanese forces on the borders of Manchukuo were almost chronic. Formal war seemed on numerous occasions to be impending. The major threat of war between great powers in the Far East appeared to lie in a Russo-Japanese war.

At the same time Great Britain herself seemed to be carrying the burden of obstruction to Japan in China, and the Japanese were wreaking vengeance on British subjects and British interests. The latter suffered heavy material losses, and with respect to the former, it will be recalled that Neville Chamberlain told the Commons that the humiliations inflicted on Britons made his blood boil—at the very time when the German advance on Czecho-Slovakia left him cool enough to send Runciman to clear the way. Again, the contrast with Japanese-American relations was glaring, and none would have thought that Britain was traditionally Japan's friend and buffer and that only a few years before had sabotaged efforts at Geneva to check the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.

Then came the European war and a year later the German victories in the West, leaving British, French and Dutch possessions in the Far East exposed. The Japanese began their stage-by-stage advance southward. Obviously Singapore was their first objective, the Dutch East Indies second. Strictly speaking, the issue was between Great Britain and Japan, or the Netherlands and Japan. The Philippines did not come into question at all. Then suddenly, almost by political sleight-of-hand, the issue was metamorphosed into one between Japan and the United States. Even before the Japanese advanced into southern Indo-China, directly threatening Thailand and Singapore and bringing on the freezing of Japanese credits in the United States, negotiations had begun in Washington between Japan and the United States. Why in Washington? And why between Japan and the United States? And in Washington they remained until step by step they moved to impasse, and the Japanese bombers swooped down on Pearl Harbor. To the end Britain, Russia, France and the Netherlands East Indies government were spectators.

What was the content of the negotiations and on what did decision turn? The statement by Secretary Hull giving the exchange of notes was revealing. Generalities apart, the American government asked Japan to evacuate Indo-China and China and to recognize Chungking as the government of China. Generalities apart, the Japanese government offered to evacuate Indo-China if and when peace was made in China, by inference peace on Japanese terms. But it did offer to evacuate at once southern Indo-China, ostensibly the

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occasion for the American retaliations that had brought on the climax. In short, the stumbling-block was China. And this was in accord with all precedents. For without the documentary evidence presented in the Hull statement, it was clear to those who knew the Far East that Japan might concede everything else but not China, that she very likely would, in fact, concede everything else if in return she received American recognition, and thereby British recognition, of her conquest of China. British Malaya, French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies were not in themselves worth a war to Japan; China was. British Malaya, French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies may or may not have been worth a war to the United States; but on China it drew the line. On China the war came and, logically in the circumstances, against America the first Japanese attack was directed.

Through all modern Far Eastern history runs a single logical thread: the status of China. Shall China be independent or a colony, and, if a colony, subject to what empire? So long as that question has not been definitively answered there has been no real peace in the Far East but only an uneasy truce. Until it is settled there will be no peace. Why America should be a protagonist for one answer—for an independent China—it is not easy to say.

Partly the reason lies in the desire of all governments for consistency for its own sake: reversal of policy is confession of previous error and a wound to self-esteem, raising considerations of prestige. Partly it lies in considerations of security, of balance of power. Partly—probably mostly—it lies in the economic stake which the development of China offers and the unwillingness of the United States to permit any other power to appropriate that stake. Whatever the reason, there has been a steady, almost fateful, progression toward culmination in a Far Eastern war since the United States emerged from political adolescence and became a world power at the turn of the century.

Over China we are at war and over China we shall be at war again unless China is wholly free or irrevocably conquered by some one great power. Since irrevocable conquest is almost inconceivable unless one power acquires unchallengeable world supremacy, this is to say that we shall be at war again and recurrently unless China is independent and secure in her own right. As a matter of fact the charter of peace in the Far East lies in the terms the American government submitted to Japan: evacuation of all alien military forces from China, abandonment of extra-territoriality and all foreign rights and interests in concessions and settlements on Chinese soil. These were the conditions of peace as between the United States and Japan. They will be the conditions of peace as among any other powers in the Far East after this war. Secretary Hull has himself written in advance of the war the crucial provisions for the treaty of peace that will conclude it, provisions that must operate against all great powers and not Japan only. Thus and thus alone will the fatal historical continuity of Far Eastern politics be broken. So we know what we are fighting for in the Far East.

NATHANIEL PEFFER

Our Immediate Task

At last our hour has come, when our ultimate strength is tested, and the hopes of the world rest upon the decision. With it have come the great solvents of war, cleansing the consciousness and will of America in a way that could not have been achieved in peacetime.

We look for victory. It demands of us tasks so tremendous that they dwarf our present effort. To meet these tasks, we must achieve unity; but unity, to be lasting, must be based, not on our present failures, but on the program for victory which our leadership undertakes.

In the first moments of our hour, we have suffered heavy defeats. Our naval losses expose the failure of our naval strategy. The failure of our War Department and of the Office of Production Management in production and preparedness is not yet exposed in action; but it is known. Behind these immediate failures lie years of mistaken diplomacy which strengthened the Axis.

Inevitably, when these failures are fully understood, Secretaries Knox, Stimson and Hull, and later William Knudsen, will undergo violent criticism. Our greatest danger now is that our criticism may stop with these men. The fact is that in each case the failure is a group and not an individual responsibility. Because real unity in America demands real leadership, we need to be critical of these groups in a positive way.

In foreign relations, it was the responsibility of the Foreign Service to report accurately to the President the plans of the Axis and to prepare all possible support for America in case of an emergency. For years, it is now clear, the Foreign Service has misinformed us concerning Japan's and Germany's intentions, and the nations of Latin America have been left open to Axis intrigue. In common fairness to our new allies, China, Russia and Britain, we should rid ourselves of those who negotiated with our enemies. Far more important, we need now to mobilize all Latin America for war upon the Axis. This means preparedness for invasion, the institution of a patrol system, the extension of the blockade and rounding up all Axis agents. The Foreign

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Service, as a group, is incapable of directing this task.

In the navy, the responsibility for our defeat is again a corporate responsibility. The bureaucracy of the Navy Department has always been closed to reform. It has held its civilian chiefs, such men as Knox and Forrestal, as helpless hostages. In details of operation, the navy may be magnificent; in formulating policy, it is paralyzed by tradition and conservatism. The alternative to further naval defeat, which would be followed by a full investigation by Congress in which a large segment of the naval bureaucracy would be ripped out, is to remedy this situation no matter at what cost.

In the War Department, a military bureaucracy similar to that in the Navy has mastered details of operation and developed important innovations in technique. It has never understood its functions on the policy-making level, and it has insisted upon retaining in its own hands the vital task of obtaining production, for which it has neither training nor ability. For two years, the incompetence of the army bureaucracy in determining and fulfilling military requirements has strangled our war effort. Today the army bureaucracy is divided. The General Staff is discharging its functions in determining its requirements: the Air Corps, the Quartermaster Corps and the Ordnance Department are, by their incompetence, making the fulfilment of those requirements impossible.

Of course, there are individual generals who should be removed, just as Britain removed many of her top generals in order to live. But the problem is again not one of individuals. The entire army caste is incompetent by training, experience and character to discharge industrial and economic functions, and the heightening of the emergency by war cannot make experts of untrained men. But beyond that, we even lack officers. We need all of them we have, for military operations. The War Department should realize that for its own good the functions of contracting, subcontracting and allocating for war production, to which it still clings, must at once be transferred to a civilian agency.

In the field of production, the tasks are so new that no bureaucracy similar to the military and naval bureaucracies has yet been created. Yet already groups can be distinguished which have or have not achieved results. As a group, the government lawyers and economists who entered the defense agencies have done wonderfully well. As a group, the industrialists have not shown the same ability. They have not grasped the size of the production program; their inhibitions have prevented them from reorganizing even their own industries, and their expectations of post-war business relations with one another have led them to stand together to defend even the most obvious incompetents among them.

To approach the problem of these executives as simply a group question would of course be to create deep disunity. Many industrialists have done well, and a few have been backed by the New Deal to rise to the highest positions of leadership. They have not proved equal to the responsibilities. There is not one among them who is capable of acting as chief executive of a central production authority. Even the men in whom the greatest hope was placed have failed to sustain their early promise and have not attempted to force a real production program through. The proved failures among them must go.

Knudsen must go. As Director General of the OPM, he is the outstanding failure of the defense program. Under Knudsen, the OPM has been given full power to mobilize for all-out production. If the country realized the extent to which the OPM has been content to stand by and watch the War Department fumble the job, Knudsen would be back in Detroit today. He has never tackled the army. He has never seen production as anything more than the construction of new factories taking years to build. He has never sought to convert existing resources and, thanks to him, the automobile industry has not yet undertaken the most elementary task of conversion to war production—the pooling of its captive machine-tools equipment that Walter Reuther demanded many long months ago.

Today, Knudsen has "accepted" the victory production schedule of 1,000 heavy bombers a month. But when? Next year, or in 1943, or in three years' time? He does not know. His entire weight within the OPM, and the weight of his chosen subordinates, is today thrown against the Victory Program. To Knudsen, this program may mean a nice idea which is beyond our power to produce: to the American people, it means what it says: Victory. They want it at any cost. They have not yet realized that the cost is Knudsen. When, after months of war, we still fail to meet the Victory Program schedules, Knudsen will be found out. In war, we cannot wait. Knudsen must go.

Jesse Jones must go. By his extraordinary craft and intelligence, Jones has amassed to himself control over all strategic imports, all new defense plants and all expansion programs of aluminum and magnesium. The power that he has accumulated he has used to befriend the worst monopolies in America and, unintentionally, to delay production schedules. Jones's empire must be broken. The financing of strategic imports should go to the Economic Defense Board; the Defense Plant Corporation should go to an agency of production; or Jones himself should go.

With Jones and Knudsen must go the other men who have demonstrated their inability to do this job. A. H. Bunker, chief of the aluminum branch of the OPM, must go. H. P. Church, the senior consultant in copper; Frank Ayres, the production adviser in copper and zinc, and the other men who (as Senator Truman has shown) have aided the copper, zinc and aluminum producers deliberately to hold production down, must go.

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W. H. Harrison, chief of the Production Division of the OPM, has failed to tackle the Victory Program. He must go. Mason Britton, chief of the crucial machine-tools branch, has not measured up to the job; Merrill Meigs, the good fellow from Chicago, is still in charge of aircraft production. These and scores of other men in this division have held back production and with it our hopes of victory. They must go.

Floyd Odlum, in charge of procurement for the OPM, must go. He has begged the procurement divisions of the War Department, without success, to give him some little crumb of recognition. His main proposal, to give small business men a two-percent cut of scarce materials, has been rightly rejected by the SPAB. If the procurement functions of the War Department are to be transferred to the OPM, then Odlum should leave the Engineering Advisory Committee, which he has wisely created, in full authority.

With these men must go many others: Dr. E. R. Weidlein, the representative of the Mellon Institute in the chemicals branch; Philip Reed, assistant chief of the raw-materials division of the OPM; Charles F. Palmer, coördinator of defense housing; Lessing Rosenwald, in charge of conservation; John Lord O'Brian, the General Counsel of the OPM; Stettinius and McCabe in the Lease-Lend Administration; all these men have failed to rise to the emergency and they must go.

These are the principal failures at the defense job. In the earliest days of the war, when the people believed in compromise and industry paid no attention to defense, it was perhaps necessary, for political considerations, to bring many of these men to Washington. Today, victory is the only consideration, and none of them meets the standards that victory requires. Their continued existence in the strategic centers of the war effort endangers the safety of all of us. The danger is fully recognized in Washington. The only argument advanced against reorganization is that it would cause initial losses. We had far better suffer these losses now when the fronts are at Moscow and Manila than wait until further defeats bring the fronts to our own shores.

In these two years of war, we have passed through the stage of the Winfield Scotts. We have reached the stage of the McClellans when our plans are perfect—on paper—but we are losing the battles. Do we have to pass through the stage of the Hallecks, the Hookers and the Burnsides, with the losses of Bull Run, Corinth and Chancellorsville, before we reach the stage of the Grants and the Shermans, the only men who can bring us victory? We have our Grants and Shermans in America—the engineers out in the factories; the union men who have produced some of the best contributions to war production; able men in Washington brought forward during the New Deal; all the able old fighters who, today, are unused and ready. The issue between these men and our present executives is not one of liberalism or reaction. It is an issue of success or failure in battle. We need these men now, desperately. Pride and prejudice must not be the determinants of victory or defeat.

Washington MICHAEL STRAIGHT

Planning for Total Production

A TORRENT OF MATERIAL for waging war must go to our forces and our allies in the Pacific. More supplies, not less, must go to Britain and Russia. Vastly increased production is imperative. Already the load on industry in the United States is heavy. To build the load up to what is required and to carry the augmented burden of total war will tax not only the mechanical capacity of the United States but also our genius for organization and management.

We began by placing orders with the larger existing plants and by contracting for the construction of gigantic new mass-scale-production facilities. This assurance as to future strength involves at least three risks. Of pressing import is the risk of failure to produce the maximum possible of needed combat instruments now, today and tomorrow when the tempo of conflict is fast, when supplies and material are being used up rapidly, when the resistance of democracies to aggression hangs in the balance, and when more materials of all kinds are sorely needed. Another risk is that we may be turning excessive amounts of critical raw materials and skilled capacity into equipment that can be used only for the production of implements of war.

And again, by excessive additions to the national plant—we have already provided for them to the tune of many billion dollars and the tempo has been rapidly increasing—we are making vastly more difficult the period of post-emergency adjustment. Such an increment of new plant may stimulate at first, but there is danger of acute indigestion later. We may be imposing unnecessarily on our economic set-up to an extent that will make the illness that began in 1929 appear mild by contrast.

We must apply at once that genius for organization and management in which the United States has manifest capacity. The situation is a challenge to take in hand the total national plant and plan its utilization as effectively for all purposes—civilian as well as defense needs—as the best managed individual plants in industry are now utilized. This is the essence of the several testimonies of the undersigned before the House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration

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(John H. Tolan, chairman) which has been holding hearings on certain aspects of the defense problem.

To increase promptly the tempo and output of production for defense two steps are indicated.

One is reëxamination of all contracts heretofore let and, by negotiation, arranging for earlier delivery dates than are written into these contracts. Earlier deliveries would be possible in many cases through widespread subcontracting and by working machines more hours with more shifts. Too many of the early contracts were let in terms of business-as-usual concepts of delivery dates. Whether we knew it then or not, we now know that we are really in an acute emergency. Business-as-usual is out of the factory windows.

The other step that would have an immediate effect on productivity is to bring into defense production the great multitude of medium-size and small plants of the country. Relatively few of these may have the capacity to take prime contracts for completely assembled large-size defense material. But as a group, when properly related through organized division of labor on components, they can make promptly a substantial contribution to production. When a tank or gun is "exploded" into its subassemblies and its parts, it is found that many of them are very simple bits of production engineering. All such can be fabricated to specifications as isolated tasks in a thousand and one medium-size and small plants. The aggregate capacity of these plants is greater than anyone imagines. To take an instance, it is reported that 15 percent of one important military item in Great Britain is being produced in the maintenance units of the laundries of that country.

Utilization of the medium-size and small plants in the United States would alleviate substantially the severe priorities unemployment problem that is developing. Of course it would not eliminate it entirely, for defense production is specialized production. But such plants as could be utilized would be in operation, which means that their workers and managers would be employed. Adequate training of the workers of plants that could not be utilized would make possible the temporary transfer of many of them to the defense industries. The managers of these plants would be prized as additions to the supervisory staffs of the larger defense plants.

What is here suggested cannot be expected to come about through any spontaneous development, or even through conscious effort by business within the frame of business-as-usual. It involves a concept of the total of production facilities of the United States as belonging to one huge national enterprise engaged in the production of a particular line of goods. There are involved the coördinating controls characteristic of any successful large enterprise with multiple plants and multiple-purpose equipment. Preceding the launching of any such program must go an analysis of every item of product into its components and inventorying, classifying and pooling of facilities, as well as an over-all routing and scheduling of orders for parts.

The establishment of capacity centers such as are common in England and to be found at isolated points in this country is necessary, as well as more detailed routing and scheduling of production in the area covered by each center in accordance with recorded balances of the center as a whole and of the local area. Planning and scheduling for a calculated increase of raw materials production are involved. The training in accordance with measured needs of the various kinds of operating and supervisory skills also is required. In sum, it means a national plant with that quality of organization and operation which would resemble what one could see were one to look at the best managed existing individual plant through a powerful microscope.

The only authority that can bring what is here suggested to pass is that authority whose capacity has a reach commensurate with the scope of the problem—the federal government. It would use many lesser functional and territorial agencies, but it would have to be the general manager and organizer. A first step in the right direction would be to bring the production engineering talent of the country into the war establishments. This means a civilian expert group to organize production and its follow-up and to advise officers responsible for making contracts. They would take on the follow-up task where officers leave off. Thus the problems of production would be integrated with the technical and time needs of the military forces.

The measures designed and recommended by these experts would indicate the arrangements that would have to be made on other plants. However, the integration of these production engineers into the war establishments would have to be genuine and with opportunity for expert creative service. They would not be effective if smothered in the coils of obsolete and ineffective bureaucratic procedures. Their expertness would have to be recognized through appropriate authority.

The battle fronts in Russia and Libya swing back and forth; a new battle front in the Pacific is blazing; survival of the essential liberties of democracy is in jeopardy. On the scale of and in terms of modern institutions, this democracy of the United States has yet to organize its capacity for victory as effectively, relatively, as did our forefathers in the days of Indian uprisings and cattle rustling on the frontiers.

MORRIS L. COOKE H. S. PERSON
S. T. HENRY ALEX TAUB

The above statement was prepared just as the United States swung into total war. The immediate future, the authors of the statement would like to point out, is likely to call for a production formula even more sweeping than that outlined here. —THE EDITORS

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Labor Goes to War

The following is a digest of a detailed report prepared by the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers through its research director, Ben Riskin, as an answer to the nation's needs for greatly increased production of many non-ferrous metals. Here is an outstanding example of the kind of practical contribution labor is capable of making to the war program. – THE EDITORS

THE TIME for discussion and argument is over. The battle for survival and, with it, the fight for all-out production is on. In that fight, labor's role is fundamental. The International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers fully recognizes its responsibility for greater production. We believe that the measures urged thus far by mine operators and by defense officials to increase copper, lead and zinc production are largely ineffective. We therefore offer a plan of our own devising. It is, we believe, a new approach to the problem. Our recommendations are:

1. *We must make an industry-wide inventory.*

We must immediately undertake a detailed and complete inventory of the industry to ascertain the number of mines in operation, the present real capacity of those mines at full-time operation, the number of miners at work, the potential capacity of the mines if new equipment were installed, the availability of new mines. Such information has never been assembled. It must be done without delay. The results of proceeding without such basic information are best illustrated by showing what actually has happened in the fabricating end of this industry, where defense officials a year ago faced an industrial situation in which fabricating capacity was greater than mine output from both domestic and foreign sources under existing production practices. Without the slightest explanation of their action, they suddenly granted $35,000,000 to the brass industry to expand brass production by another 79 percent in spite of the fact that there was not then enough copper and zinc supply to meet existing brass capacity. Now the War Department has had to order major curtailment of shell cases because of overproduction of this vital defense article in comparison with loading facilities.

2. *We must make full use of industry's resources.*

The resources of our metal-mining industry are not being fully utilized. There are two sources of additional production which must immediately be brought into operation. These are: mines which were shut down during the depression, and work-places in operating mines which are not being exploited. For example, according to the bureau of the census, there were 180 operating copper mines in 1929. By 1939, there were only 49 producing copper mines, and the total output of recoverable copper had dropped 28 percent below the 1929 figure.

Certainly it would be worth while to determine how many of the 131 copper mines that have been shut down since 1929, how many of the 121 lead and zinc mines, how many of the 34 iron-ore mines, ceased operations because of depletion and how many stopped operating because of the general economic collapse of the thirties, but are still potentially productive. A certain amount of capital expenditure may be necessary to bring such mines back into operation, but any metal remaining in them is needed now, and must be brought to the surface. In addition, throughout the industry specific instances of failure to operate at capacity, or anywhere near capacity, occur. A typical example:

The Bunker Hill and Sullivan Mining and Concentrating Company, an important lead and zinc producer in Idaho, owns the Bunker Hill Mine and operates on one shift. This mine has twenty-three levels, of which Nos. 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 and 16 are not being worked. Of its two mills, one is wholly, the other partially, idle. It has one smelter, with a capacity of 350 tons of lead per day. It is now turning out about 195 tons of lead per day. The company operates at capacity when all three of its blast furnaces are working full-time. Its No. 3 blast furnace has about the same capacity as Nos. 1 and No. 2 combined—but the No. 3 furnace is not operating at this time. We must end such blackouts.

Bound to the question of capacity production is the need for unbroken operations and for ending conditions which result in the astonishing rate of turnover in the working staff. In one of the world's largest mining camps, a recent survey revealed the amazing fact that more than half the employees (out of a total of 5,000) worked less than half the month. Yet in this camp, the management's major campaign has been to put its workers on the six-day week—apparently indifferent to the fact that even under a six-day week, if the same turnover continued, the company would actually be getting an average of three days' work per man. Mining operators and defense officials have repeatedly brought pressure on labor to work a six-day week.

Countering this illogical and unproductive proposal is the union's proposal that the basic eight-hour day and five-day week be maintained, with over-all operations expanded not to a mere six days, but to seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day. We advance this as the goal with full realization that it cannot be immediately achieved until some modifications in production technique and working conditions are made.

4. *We must organize multiple shifts.*

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Various mine operators continue to assert that mines cannot be operated on a multiple-shift basis. But multiple-shift operations may be found in every type of metal mining, and idle mine capacity undoubtedly is just as wasteful—even more wasteful than idle plant capacity generally.

5. *We must clean the air.*

To guarantee that a miner will remain at work, intolerable conditions of employment must be rectified. A major factor in this respect is that of ventilation. On November 15, four miners employed at Butte, Montana, in the St. Lawrence Mine of the Anaconda Copper Mining Company—Nick Butko, Fred Bugni, Charles Makela and Charles Thomas—died of suffocation at their work-place underground. The four dead workers are grim reminders that the men still alive, the half-suffocated men still working in the mines, cannot be expected to work efficiently and to produce as much as they could under normal conditions.

6. *We must rationalize the contract system.*

Many of the major mining operators impose a contract system in their wage payments which theoretically encourages a miner to stay at work constantly, giving him a wage higher than the base rate in proportion to the feet of rock broken above the established norm. In practice, it makes it profitable for the miner to work only in locations where (a) the temperature and humidity permit full steam ahead; (b) the nature of the rock allows comparatively easy and good results; and (c) the methods of servicing and access to supplies are conducive to efficient work. The contract system must be modified to stop the pressure which forces men to quit their jobs rather than to continue working in a place in which they cannot "make their rate."

7. *We must use the available labor supply.*

Basic to multiple-shift operations, of course, is the question of labor supply. Inevitably, even in the face of unemployment figures in the hands of local, state or federal agencies, the operators insist that they are unable to obtain a sufficient number of skilled miners.

Between 1929 and 1941, 130,000 skilled miners were thrown out of work. Most of these men are still available. But wages will have to be raised in the substandard fields of Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma and Michigan, and decent housing will have to be provided if these men are to return to the mines.

9. *We must divide the jobs.*

There are some mines in the industry where the miner does every job—drills, blasts, shovels, timbers, hauls his tools, and so on—each service part of his assignment taking away from his basic production job. In no mine has the whole question of work specialization been carried out in the most efficient manner possible. Profits per worker tend to be larger in mining than in manufacturing, so that the pressure for this division of labor, which manufacturers have always felt, has for the most part been lacking among mining operators. If special-service crews were constantly available to see that the necessary auxiliary work was done, the miners could produce without delay.

The remaining barriers to a full three-shift operation are minor. The mines must be better serviced with supplies and tools. The ore trains must be made to run without long delays. The haulage system, by which the ore is taken from the veins, can be substantially improved, and the present bottleneck of hoisting capacity must, and can, be eliminated. If these measures are adopted, more lead, zinc and copper can be brought to the surface without greatly increased prices. We believe that no increased prices should be paid except as a bonus for additional production, or as a differential subsidy for marginal high-cost mines.

10. *Union members should share the responsibility for production.*

More rock will be brought to the surface and more metal recovered only if the miners and smeltermen become an integral part of the whole production picture. Specific problems of production should be tackled on the spot through mine or plant production. Committees, composed jointly of management and union representatives, should also meet with representatives of the government at the over-all industry level. Toward this program of all-out production to smash fascism, to guarantee victory, the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers of the CIO stands pledged and ready.

Entrepreneur

Sleep takes the dreamer
as the sea the swimmer.

Deep in his wish
what lovers flash
are met, who weave,
wave on dark wave,
a full embrace;
whole is their kiss
as water's; rich
with total touch
of love, their bed
lies islanded.

Washed upon day
those eyes will see;
lifted from sleep
those fingers map
the continent
Atlantis meant,
where for his sake
new suns will strike
and the dream persist,
being known at last.

The cliffs of morning
melt, have meaning.

KENNETH A. SCHOLES

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Washington Notes

Freedom of the Press in Wartime

MANY highly important problems of organization for total war remain unsolved as we enter our second week of belligerency. Some of them require immediate solution. The consequences of inaction may come high not only in treasure but in human life. Among them is the problem of fitting the free press into the structure of a society fit to fight.

Some who deal with news in Washington have come to the conclusion in the last few weeks, and come to it reluctantly, that a government censorship is needed. The unpleasant fact is that a few of the most influential journalists in Washington and a few of the most reputable journals in the country are not to be trusted with facts that shouldn't, for good military and diplomatic reasons, be printed.

Publication by the McCormick-Patterson newspapers of a secret plan of military and naval action against the Axis powers was, of course, the most conspicuous example of irresponsibility. But there have been others, less blatant perhaps but no less significant.

There is the story of Philippine defense, for example. It can be told now. One day in mid-November General George C. Marshall called in representatives of The New York Times, The New York Herald Tribune, Time, Newsweek, the AP, the UP and the INS. He told them in some detail of this nation's plan to defend rather than abandon the Philippines in the event of war with Japan. He told them how it was to be done and why. It was a major strategic decision—one which would, if known, have an enormously important bearing on Japanese policy.

On November 19, The New York Times carried the story, complete with map, under the signature of Arthur Krock, head of its Washington bureau. Nobody else printed it. The Times had a representative at Marshall's conference and he accepted the obligation of secrecy. Krock was not there himself, but he obviously was bound, if there is such a thing as journalistic ethics, by the agreement entered into by his subordinate. Krock never was released from the understanding by Marshall, although another War Department official is understood to have consented to publication of the story.

Krock was fully conscious of the importance of his story to the Japanese. He pointed out in his article that Saburo Kurusu, the Japanese peace envoy, might learn of the change in United States Far Eastern strategy "in some such way as reading this dispatch." He created the impression that high government officials wanted the Japs to know that they were prepared to defend the Philippines and that he, Krock, had been chosen as the exclusive purveyor of this information. If that was so, Marshall wasn't informed of the plan to make Krock the special messenger to the Japanese. He was represented by an aide as upset by publication of the story. Had he decided to let it out, he would have released it to all who had attended the conference.

It is quite possible that the Japanese benefited from Krock's story. It is certain that the information was released against the wishes of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army. Krock in effect overruled Marshall's judgment in a matter of high policy. Either this, or else he was indifferent to consequences. In any case, his conduct indicated the need for censorship. Fortunately, there aren't many reckless correspondents in Washington. But the majority of bureau chiefs who justified Marshall's confidence will have to be subjected to the same restraint as the one who didn't.

In the light of these facts, it is interesting and perhaps important to note that on December 11, four days after Japan had attacked Hawaii and the Philippines, Krock's column in The Times squawked against the President's announcement that no war news would be made available until it was known to be accurate and until it would not give aid and comfort to the enemy. Under cover of this formula, Krock complained, the President was holding back information to which the American people were entitled regarding the outcome of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

At the time Krock wrote this complaint, the reason for withholding facts about the extent of the navy's losses was obvious. Dispatches from Tokyo showed that the Japanese were not certain how much damage they had done. It was important for them to find out. There could have been no other good reason for suppressing news of the very serious defeat. So far as morale was concerned, the worse the news the better. Dunkirk is the medicine for national indifference and uncertainty, as everyone has known since Britain's experience.

Yet the implication of Krock's column was that the President meant to use the war emergency as an excuse for doing unnecessary violence to freedom of the press. It was as if John L. Lewis, after provoking passage of the Smith bill by the House, had complained that the President had goaded Congress into a state of wrath against labor. Even Lewis had the grace not to make any such complaint. Or maybe he just hasn't got around to it as yet.

The fact is that there still is no effective censorship. The army and navy, to be sure, are trying to confine themselves to official communiqués. This is simply a matter of withholding at the source, the same method that was used during the emergency preceding the declaration of war on Japan. This system didn't prevent the McCormick-Patterson leak or, for that matter, the Krock leak. Any information that trickles out of the War or Navy Department can still be printed by anyone with a thick skin and a printing press. In the competition for news, it puts a premium on brashness and a penalty on conscientiousness.

The President's yardstick is too flexible and indefinite for measurement of military information by a reporter or editor. There is no central agency to appeal to when in doubt. J. Edgar Hoover, who has been placed temporarily in charge of what is called censorship coördination—meaning apparently decisions as to what should and what should not be released by government agencies—is the worst possible choice. He has been leaking news to a few journalistic favorites for too many years to be trusted by the press generally. What is needed is a censor big enough to inspire faith that all the news that's safe to print is being passed by him.

Washington T. R. B.

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The Legion Rides Again

COMES AGAIN the question of movie censorship. Depending on where you live (Boston, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Providence, Rochester, Albany), you will have heard the Catholic Legion getting into action on the film, "Two-Faced Woman." In some places they have got it officially banned. In all places they have got the producers so scared they are reported as willing to withdraw, cut and reshoot, if only the picture can be taken off the "objectionable" list. I don't think the Catholic Legion wants a few objectionable things taken out so much as it wants an issue.

Let me start at the beginning. Years ago when the Legion of Decency and I were both starting, a wise old editor said, "Write an editorial saying that this is just another transient reform wave. These people," he said, "are a simple case of psychological maladjustment, meaning nothing. I have seen it come and go a hundred times in my career. Say that it hardly merits the attention of intelligent people," he said wearily, and went back to his work as a signal that I should damn well get on with mine. When I began to grow up I quickly discovered that forces for evil were actually working and winning out in this matter, that the uneasy and itching element in the Catholic minority had got control of the Catholic machinery and its organized effect on national publicity, that they had stampeded the Protestants and all other Better Breakfast Food groups, and had captured the movies. Or that was what they thought. What a couple of faceless scrubs named Will Hays and Joe Breen thought was that they had captured the Catholic Legion, and damn well cut themselves as big a piece of pie in Hollywood as anyone had who'd been playing the racket through all the years, and winning. Whoever captured whom, the Hays Office was a tyrant to producers with money to invest and flesh to quiver at every alarm.

And the Hays nix on any matter of truth is a part of film history. On the actual things that are actually made, the office can be lenient, in proportion to the producer's investment of course. But its influence on what can be taken up as a subject, what can be written into a movie script, what can be made with cameras, is insidious and final. To give one modern example: why wasn't the scenario of Vincent Sheean's "Personal History" ever advanced farther than the shelf by the producer—Walter Wanger, the press agents' College Man—when the movie minds judged it ready to go? Could it be that the movie liberal had done a straight liberal, or somersault for the money, when the Hays Office had refused to commit itself until the picture was made? Between you and me, it damn well could.

Could it be that Garson Kanin had to fight every last point of the story of "They Knew What They Wanted" with his own studio as it quaked under the Hays Office? Could be, possibly. That he finally made the picture his own way is only an illustration of a lousy state of affairs. In any such state, watched over by such an organization of orgulence and stealth, the man who comes through must come through with a belief in his heart like barricades. And so it has been possible for men whose talents ran counter to the industry and also to the Hays Office which it made possible, to beat down narrow prejudice and to give us the event as it truly happened. But as the gap was opened, gag men rushed in, and flooded the public again with plays on words and plays on situations which were no more than the sly echo of the jaded laughter of burlesque. I mean that the Hays Office has been more concerned with such delicate subjects as the condition of working men, poor men, the never rewarded salesmen and farmers, than it has been with the indelicate and essentially useless and unmeaningful gag about a husband sleeping with his wife.

Many things have been allowed and passed over with a sort of bought tolerance. But many things have died in the initial stage before you ever heard about them. And many things have been crippled after the project was under way. And in such cases, who is to say which is which? The public decides, finally, and we are the public. If we have allowed such power-loving people as Will Hays and Joe Breen (Breen has already promoted himself into an executive job at RKO) and Hays's earnest stooge Martin P. Quigley—if we have allowed them to take over, we deserve what happened. By being fed a few bleeding hearts for appearance's sake, the major companies have been able to get away with more and more doubtful cracks and sly situations—never to the advantage of pictures at large, but always to the spicing up of some stale wind of plot. With the very few exceptions of men of courage and conviction, the producers have simply used the term "better," in connection with pictures, as the Catholic Legion has used it, and they have been satisfied to seek no further but connive with the stealthy complacence of the Hays Office in getting this or that faint saving tract of smut certified and onto the screens of the nation. Breen has got himself a fat and handsome job at RKO and maybe some day they will pension Hays off as sheriff or circus press agent or something. No matter for them.

The question is, now that they have made their pile and had their day of dictator's glory, who is going to take over this new awakening of the Catholic Legion, and ride it to our loss? Variety reports that in cities where the double-intention gags of "Two-Faced Woman" have drawn a blast from the clergy, the picture is doing double business. This would be a fitting outcome but it would be unfortunate even if it could last, which it can't. When any work of art is cried up as salacious, it gets around to the psychotic types who are the mere obverse of the censors, if they aren't the censors themselves. And any work of art which consciously stirs up such a cry or plays to these types, is just that much farther from art itself and from the general good. What we want to know, the majority of us, is what mangy assortment of tails is trying to wag this majority dog. I have seen the Catholic ladies at screenings and I can report that they compose a congregation of horrors that no good Catholic would have any business with if he had any business at all. Yet they are part of the organization which is going to tell us what we may see for the next ten years. There is no need ever for a religious war. In a nation already at war there is no room for interfactional bickering. But the Catholic Legion has proved itself, in the movies, an enemy of the spacious truth, an actual abettor of petty filth—that is, the dirt you can get away with for an extra dollar, and never mind that it never came out of the honest earth. If you are a good Catholic you will not take this amiss, and could not do so with integrity. If you are a good Catholic you will know that for the sake of the country if not your own, it is time to clean your stables.

OTIS FERGUSON

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My Life with R. H. Macy

AND THE FIRST THING THEY DID was segregate me. They segregated me from the only person in the place I had even a speaking acquaintance with; that was a girl I had met going down the hall who said to me: "Are you as scared as I am?" And when I said "Yes," she said "I'm in lingerie, what are you in?" and I thought for a while and then said "Spun glass," which was as good an answer as I could think of, and she said, "Oh. Well, I'll meet you here in a sec." And she went away and was segregated and I never saw her again.

Then they kept calling my name and I kept trotting over to wherever they called it and they would say ("They" all this time being startlingly beautiful young women in tailored suits and with short-clipped hair), "Go with Miss Cooper, here. She'll tell you what to do." All the women I met my first day were named Miss Cooper. And Miss Cooper would say to me: "What are you in?" and I had learned by that time to say "Books," and she would say "Oh, well, then, you belong with Miss Cooper here," and then she would call "Miss Cooper?" and another young woman would come and the first one would say "13-3138 here belongs with you," and Miss Cooper would say "What is she in?" and Miss Cooper would answer "Books," and I would go away and be segregated again.

Then they taught me. They finally got me segregated into a classroom, and I sat there for a while all by myself (that's how far segregated I was) and then a few other girls came in, all wearing tailored suits (I was wearing a red velvet afternoon frock) and we sat down and they taught us. They gave us each a big book with R. H. Macy written on it, and inside this book were pads of little sheets saying (from left to right) "Comp. keep for ref. cut. d.a. no. or c.t. no. salesbook no. salescheck no. clerk no. dept. date M." After M there was a long line for Mr. or Mrs. and the name, and then it began again with "No. item. class. at price. total." And down at the bottom was written ORIGINAL and then again "Com. keep for ref." and "Paste yellow gift stamp here." I read all this very carefully. Pretty soon a Miss Cooper came, who talked for a little while on the advantages we had in working at Macy's, and she talked about the salesbooks, which it seems came apart into a sort of road map and carbons and things. I listened for a while, and when Miss Cooper wanted us to write on the little pieces of paper, I copied from the girl next to me. That was training.

Finally someone said we were going on the floor, and we descended from the sixteenth floor to the first. We were in groups of six by then, all following Miss Cooper doggedly and wearing little tags saying BOOK INFORMATION. I never did find out what that meant. Miss Cooper said I had to work on the special sale counter, and showed me a little book called "The Stage-Struck Seal," which it seemed I would be selling. I had gotten about halfway through it before she came back to tell me I had to stay with my unit.

I enjoyed meeting the time clock, and spent a pleasant half-hour punching various cards standing around, and then someone came in and said I couldn't punch the clock with my hat on. So I had to leave, bowing timidly at the time clock and its prophet, and I went and found out my locker number, which was 1773, and my time-clock number, which was 712, and my cash-box number, which was 1336, and my cash-register number, which was 253, and my cash-register-drawer number, which was K, and my cash-register-drawer-key number, which was 872, and my department number, which was 13. I wrote all these numbers down. And that was my first day.

My second day was better. I was officially on the floor. I stood in a corner of a counter, with one hand possessively on "The Stage-Struck Seal," waiting for customers. The counter head was named 13-2246, and she was very kind to me. She sent me to lunch three times, because she got me confused with 13-6454 and 13-3141. It was after lunch that a customer came. She came over and took one of my stage-struck seals, and said "How much is this?" I opened my mouth and the customer said "I have a D. A. and I will have this sent to my aunt in Ohio. Part of that D. A. I will pay for with a book dividend of 32 cents, and the rest of course will be on my account. Is this book price-fixed?" That's as near as I can remember what she said. I smiled confidently, and said "Certainly; will you wait just one moment?" I found a little piece of paper in a drawer under the counter: it had "Duplicate Triplicate" printed across the front in big letters. I took down the customer's name and address, her aunt's name and address, and wrote carefully across the front of the duplicate triplicate "1 Stg. Strk. Sl." Then I smiled at the customer again and said carelessly: "That will be seventy-five cents." She said "But I have a D. A." I told her that all D. A's were suspended for the Christmas rush, and she gave me seventy-five cents, which I kept. Then I rang up a "No Sale" on the cash register and I tore up the duplicate triplicate because I didn't know what else to do with it.

Later on another customer came and said "Where would I find a copy of Ann Rutherford Gwynn's 'He Came Like Thunder'?" and I said "In medical books, right across the way," but 13-2246 came and said "That's philosophy, isn't it?" and the customer said it was, and 13-2246 said "Right down this aisle, in dictionaries." The customer went away, and I said to 13-2246 that her guess was as good as mine, anyway, and she stared at me and explained that philosophy, social sciences and Bertrand Russell were all kept in dictionaries. When I asked her why, she said vaguely that they sold about the same.

So far I haven't been back to Macy's for my third day, because that night when I started to leave the store, I fell down the stairs and tore my stockings and the doorman said that if I went to my department head Macy's would give me a new pair of stockings and I went back and I found Miss Cooper and she said "Go to the adjuster on the seventh floor and give him this," and she handed me a little slip of pink paper and on the bottom of it was printed "Comp. keep for ref. cust. d.a. no. or c.t. no. salesbook no. salescheck no. clerk no. dept. date M." And after M, instead of a name, she had written 13-3138. I took the little pink slip and threw it away and went up to the fourth floor and bought myself a pair of stockings for $.69 and then I came down and went out the customers' entrance.

I wrote Macy's a long letter, and I signed it with all my numbers added together and divided by 11,700, which is the number of employees in Macy's. I wonder if they miss me.

SHIRLEY JACKSON

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The Bandwagon

One man, one man only, a real tyrannical Democrat, through a series of infinite provocations, betraying with a supreme fraud the population of his country, wanted the war and had prepared for it day by day with diabolical obstinacy. – *Mussolini in his declaration of war on the United States as quoted in The New York Post.*

Under various influences Roosevelt has tried to create conflicts everywhere, to deepen existing conflicts and to prevent a peaceful settlement of existing conflicts. For years he wished there might arise in Europe a conflict in which by taking sides he might engage American industry. – *Hitler in his declaration of war on the United States as quoted in The New York Times.*

Most feeders find Kow-Kare a valuable aid before, during and after the ordeal of calving. Try it yourself. – *From an advertisement of Kow-Kare printed in The American Agriculturist.*

A Worm's-Eye's View of Paris

Several of my friends have contributed little realistic, innermost peeps on life in Paris as it is being lived at the moment. And one can't help being vastly entertained at the swing and dash of it, the cleanliness of Paris, the utter sobriety, and everyone working, even father. Idlers are sent off somewhere in the hinterland to work, Poland, maybe, and social events are many. One side of the Champs Elysées is lined with chic cafés and patisseries, and the other, not so good. The indescribable, unspeakable style of the French woman has never stood forth so perfect as at the present moment. In the social set of the young Duchesse de Montebello, the Dampierres, Rochefoucaulds, Rohans, etc., the young women have almost a uniform, at the daily cocktail teas. They wear long, beautifully cut and tailored coats of black cloth over a short skirt. Their shoes are exquisite but not of leather. Their hats are divine. They are soignées, appealing, lovely, and rather thin on the whole. – *From the society section of The Chicago Daily Tribune.*

The Art of Reading

Marianne Moore, author of "What Are the Years?" (Macmillan, $1.50), is a poet with her own style and ability to impress her personality on language. Hers is a curious and intricate art in which the way the lines are printed on the page, the way in which each line is read, the way the words are sounded, help to make the poem, and if you mistakenly read it, you miss the point. – *From The New York Times Sunday Book Review.*

Total-War Department

And speaking of blouses, if the lad about whom you are worrying is a private and likes his clothes to fit well, probably he is none too happy over what the quartermaster has issued him and would like his blouse, at least, to be custom-made. You can take care of this for him at Brooks, or any shop with a military-tailoring department, provided you supply the measurements. For a custom blouse in olive-drab serge—the required material for privates—Brooks charges $75; slacks, if you want them, are $27 extra. – *From The New Yorker.*

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column; $1 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, care of The New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping. – THE EDITORS

Correspondence

"Something That Must Be Done"

SIR: I am a private in one of the training battalions in a replacement training center. We have almost completed the thirteen weeks' basic training prescribed for the new soldiers. We have dug ditches, built tank-traps, practised rifle marksmanship and learned to use bayonets. In a week or so we are to be shipped out to help form new units in the fighting arm of the nation. I have often wondered just how we would take it when war came our way. Yesterday I had the chance to find out.

It was Sunday afternoon just after chow. The boys in my barracks were lying on their bunks; some were asleep, others were reading the comics or detective stories. A small, blary portable radio was tuned to a jazz program. The program was interrupted and, without much ado, an announcer stated that Honolulu had been bombed. The readers looked up quietly and then they woke up the sleepers.

There was silence for a few moments, and a little tenseness. Then somebody smiled, made a dirty remark, and the tenseness was gone. Nobody got excited—at least not about being in a shooting war. There was some anxiety, but it was for the Christmas furloughs that we feared would be canceled. Somebody said there wasn't any use saving any more for a trip home; he might as well get in a crap game. And so one was started.

At 4:30 chow there was still no excitement. The chief concern was over the furloughs and the piecrust which the baker had burnt. Later in the evening at the Service Club, the usual Sunday-night crowd was in the cafeteria drinking coffee and sipping chocolate malts and chatting about the Bowl games and women. I noticed the same calm, the same acceptance of the war at our door.

When I got back to the barracks the lights were out. Almost everybody was in bed and quiet. The radio was on but turned down low. An announcer was reading excerpts from editorials representative of the various sections of the nation's press. A Missouri public figure had said that he was as ready to fight for Hawaii and the Philippines as he was for Missouri. I went down to take a shower, and I thought what a wonderful place the world would be when any outbreak of violence anywhere would be of this general concern to the rest of the world.

While I was in the shower my sergeant came in. He said he expected to be transferred to line duty immediately. He is a happy-go-lucky-don't-give-a-damn fellow, but he had this to say: "You know, you can't do everything in this world you want to. There's a lot of things a guy's got to do that he don't like. This is one for me, and I'm gonna do it."

In these simple words I think he expressed the feelings of most of us. We gripe about the food, about getting up at 5:30, about furloughs, about anything, about everything, but down underneath it all we realize there is something that must be done, and to get it done we have got to do things we hate like hell to do.

JEFFERSON G. ARTZ

Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.

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Author's Correction

SIR: Meanings are often so obscured by words that if the words are well arranged without the meaning the error passes unnoticed. Thus I suspect that of those who read the last sentence of my article, "Physiology since Pavlov," in The New Republic for December 1, the majority did not detect a misprint or error, leaving only a few to blame the author for obscurity or stupidity. As printed, the sentence read, "While the laboratory shows us the irrevocable fatalism of environment plus individual, it also supports a hope based upon the knowledge of the reactions resulting from environment minus individual." The printer, perhaps fascinated by the antithesis of *plus* and *minus*, as well as confused by a badly spaced hyphen, and proceeding on the principle of "*sapientibus omnia facilia*" somewhat analogous to "*puris omnia pura*," converted *environment-individual* into *environment minus individual*. Thus the environment has been left dangling without anything to environ, somewhat in the same dilemma of the loud voice without ear to detect it. I am grateful to the editors of The New Republic for this opportunity to reaffirm my original meaning—that there is a beam of hope ahead for the progress of human relationships from the study of *environment-individual* as a unit.

W. HORSLEY GANTT

Phipps Psychiatric Clinic,
Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, Baltimore, Md.

Praise for Cowley

SIR: I want to send applause and a few cheers for Malcolm Cowley's December 1 article on Van Wyck Brooks. I think it is the most sensible judgment I've seen as yet in this most recent Battle of the Books. So many recent critical positions are overstated, or seem more aware of antagonists or of narcissistic absolutist theories than of literature, that it is a pleasure to see someone trying to be just and clear.

Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. DONALD A. STAUFFER

Radio Broadcasting in Wartime

SIR: In a time of war we hear a great deal about control. Every effort is made to keep any one business or economic group from capitalizing upon the disaster for its individual gain. One major industry, however, has apparently escaped the notice of the administration. That industry is the radio broadcasting corporations, which are rapidly making a good business of hysteria. In the past, wars have often been won only when blood was brought to the boiling point and mass anxiety reached a degree of tension which resulted in drastic action. But in the coördinated war machine of today, where victory is a matter of craft and plan, hysteria may easily be a great factor in bringing about defeat.

I accuse the radio broadcasters of being one of the chief agents in bringing about hysteria. Masking under the guise of informing the public, they keep attention riveted upon the radio to such an extent that many who listen are trapped into confusion and panic. Specifically their guilt lies in:

1. Unnecessary interruption of scheduled programs to issue unconfirmed bulletins which frighten rather than inform.
2. Devoting hours to commentary and interruption by men who are often unqualified to do either, and whose information is seldom official.
3. Incessant repetition of the same item of news.
4. Capitalizing upon disaster by falsely dramatizing many of the serious issues of war.
5. The substitution of maudlin patriotism for an intelligent appreciation of the real factors involved.

My own suggestion would be to limit the studios to four or five scheduled news broadcasts per day. No item should be allowed over the airwaves until officially confirmed by Washington. Commentators should be urged to confine their guesswork to bulletins already confirmed, and to restrain their opinions as much as possible. Regular programs should be interrupted at the quarter-hour only, and then only if the news item has not been broadcast before. Anything that might unnecessarily result in fright or panic should be carefully checked before it is released. "Human-interest" programs should be reduced to a minimum.

New York City FREDERIC REEVE

For a Free Germany

SIR: The suggestion of Mr. Dawson (The New Republic, December 8) for a free German government in exile is one that deserves support. The Congress for Democracy, an organization of Americans of German birth or ancestry, whose purpose is to combat un-American activities by Nazi sympathizers in the United States, might sponsor this movement, or at least support it. Mr. Gerhart H. Seger, vice-president of this congress, was a member of the Reichstag from 1930 to 1933. He was sent to a concentration camp when Hitler came to power, escaped and is in the United States throwing his full strength into the battle for democracy. A group of such men could carry the movement forward and they would be able to make contact with the Germans in Germany who are opposed to Hitler.

Such a movement would go a long way toward helping to establish a "just and enduring peace," a peace based on economic justice for all nations, Germany included.

On the other hand there are those who propose military occupation of Germany by the Allies after the war. There will be a spirit of revenge ready to break loose and to make no distinction between the Nazi power and the people of Germany who are its helpless victims. A Free German Government in Exile, recognized by the United States and perhaps by Britain, could do much to stave off that spirit of revenge.

Berwyn, Ill. ELMER E. BURNS

SIR: J. W. Dawson's proposal is good provided we understand why the Allies failed to win the peace after the last war and what we must do to avoid repeating their mistakes.

Glastonbury, Conn. JOHN D. WILLIAMS

From The New Republic Mail Bag

In the Mailbag of November 24 we summarized a letter from Robert MacGregor of Mexico City and attributed to him the statement that "a large cross-section of the [Mexican] population blames the world's troubles on the Jews and repeats the old canard that Roosevelt is a Jew." Actually Mr. MacGregor was talking about twelve pro-Nazi Mexicans he had run across, and the slander against Mr. Roosevelt was believed by two of these. Mr. MacGregor's use of the phrase "a good half blame," etc., was incorrectly taken to mean half the population of Mexico.

E. P. Dutton and Company announces that the second Thomas Jefferson Southern Award contest is now open and will close March 15, 1942. The award of $2,500 will be given for the best book manuscript submitted by a Southern author. Fiction and non-fiction, but not poetry, are eligible, and manuscripts need not be Southern in setting or subject.

The bulk of the week's mail, postmarked as of midnight December 6, contained proposals for improving army morale, for fighting the America First Committee and for awakening Americans to the necessity for close coöperation with England and Russia to defeat a common foe. These letters now might just as well advocate the repeal of the Volstead Act, and the falling-off in letters to the editors since Sunday, December 7, proves either that our readers are stunned or that their problems are mainly solved.

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Books in Review

Grand Strategy

JUST AS an industrial efficiency expert utilizes knowledge derived from many sciences to the end of rendering a given task more *natural* to the worker, so too, the grand strategist, as defined in this book,[1] is concerned with the elucidation of the connections between war and the other activities of society, as the groundwork for the achievement of virtuosity in warfare. And by virtuosity is meant something very different from mere technical skill in maneuver or efficiency in tactical assault. The idea of native appropriateness is fundamental. The Italian Douhet, for example, in evolving his air-power doctrines, was sinning against the very make-up and potential of his country. His war technique never could have been incorporated into Italian grand strategy. The Ethiopian venture, again, though well carried out, long ago indicated that Mussolini had not the faintest conception of grand strategy. Grand strategy does not exist unless eventual military efforts are related to a matched type of diplomacy. A strategy, too, must bear a valid relationship to the character of a people. And finally —and the fundamental importance of this doctrine is well brought out by Messrs. Sergeaunt and West—since society is constantly in change, and because any given war itself is a factor in that change, the grand strategist must adapt his thinking not merely to the world as it is, but to the world as his own hands and those of his enemies will fashion it during the war he plans.

It will be seen that the theme of "Grand Strategy" is a vital one. It may happen that one may completely reject a technique of social analysis utilized by an author, and may also believe that the author has made poor use of it, and yet recognize the value of a book. A reviewer, to be useful and honest in such a predicament must make a whole series of mental translations for himself. Having done so in this case, the reviewer is ready to assert that "Grand Strategy" is richly suggestive, and likely to be extremely useful to anyone who believes he has the duty of thinking about our prosecution of the present war.

The anti-Axis powers have as yet no satisfactory grand strategy. And Germany, which, superficially, has succeeded in evolving one appropriate to her nature, has only done so if one ignores that long view which is the essence of the matter. For instance, while the attack upon Russia was not a mistake, but inherent in the German necessity, and while war with the United States was inevitable and foreseen, those very facts militate against eventual success in what alone could have been an achievable aim, of victory in a limited war for the moderate extension of the German *Lebensraum* toward Eastern Europe. In the given world, despite the diplomatic virtuosity displayed by the Reich, even such a limited aim inevitably meant a world war. That fact, recognized by Hitler, was the basis for his deliberate creation of a psychology of world conquest among the German people. Fundamentally, it was one of offering easy world conquest. Local conquests might be easy, and world conquest might be conceivable, but easy world victory by the unending consent of isolated peoples cannot be the basis of sound morale in a world which has long ceased to be a loose organization. In other words, Nazism, for all its technical virtuosity, is an inadequate grand strategy.

To turn for a moment to another virtuoso state, the Soviet Union, similar objections may be raised. The grand strategy implied by collective security was superbly conceived. Nevertheless, and this is no criticism of its essential idea, it was not in harmony with the revolutionary nature of Russian society. The short-sighted world of liberal capitalism would not coöperate, since its temporary leaders feared revolution. Nor, at the critical moment between March and August, 1939, was the Kremlin able to harmonize its demands with the nature of the oncoming war, which was clearly, unmistakably, to be fought in defense of national liberties. To demand, without the utmost clarity in defining time limits, the occupation and even possession of foreign soils, was sheerly inconsistent with successful appeal to democratic countries. Again, the Russian reversion to a revolutionary view, after the famous pact designed to give the Soviet power to intervene during European revolution, was a profound mistake. A purely revolutionary outlook cannot be the basis of successful resistance to the Axis. Full coöperation with other powers was for Russia something that could only be achieved within the framework of war itself. The pact of 1939, that is to say, made the German error of anticipating a long enduring limitation of the war. Of itself, it ensured the downfall of France and the military isolation of the Soviet Union. The criticism offered in these two cases are of the greatest importance for the elaboration of our own grand strategy.

One of the most useful concepts put forward by Messrs. Sergeaunt and West is contained in their analysis of the war of 1914-19. The way in which a war is fought determines not only the social evolution of a country, but its future grand strategy. Nazism is the German consequence, the authors declare, of the blockade which defeated the Second Reich. Henceforward, Germany would strive to conquer by rendering the blockade ineffective. To do this, she utilized the social differences between the Soviet Union and its eventual allies. To defeat the blockade she remodeled her society. (A political democracy, even an aggressive militarist one, such as Britain once was, could not have preserved secrecy or flexibility in following one unswerving intention.) If the blockade was to be withstood, peacetime rationing and therefore price-and-wage-fixing was essential. The mechanization of the timed wave-assault was obligatory if the war was to be short. Hence, the totalitarian control of capital investments. And, as Germany had grasped the reason for the Allies' post-war failure, which was due to their incapacity to make their own system work as an international order, the Nazi system was to be imposed as a permanent way of life. There is much for the Allies to learn in that willingness to plan a future.

[1] Grand Strategy, by H. A. Sergeaunt and Geoffrey West. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell and Company. 246 pages. $2.

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The reviewer, having adopted the viewpoint of the authors, and having profited greatly, confesses that he has found unsatisfactory their treatment of a rich theme. Nowhere is this inadequacy more striking than in the final chapters. Here one has a right to expect the authors to sum up with clarity, decision and usefulness. They do not, though their general argument is sound and liberal. Nevertheless, their book has the merit of leading the average reader to bolder conclusions. Utilizing doctrines at the base of the speculations above offered, and selecting only one problem confronting the anti-Axis powers, it is obvious that a long road remains to be traveled before their efforts become welded into that one unified system which alone can give success. Accepting the reasoning of "Grand Strategy," one may urge a treaty, explicit not only upon the military, but the political side also, to cover not only the prosecution of the war but the reconstruction of the world. Only such a recognition can unfetter the swift, violent and incalculable offensive it is within our powers to make. Only complete acceptance of the liberal-revolutionary doctrine can give us the energies and the morale necessary for victory in a world rocking with powerful implications. RALPH BATES

French Writing Today

THE DISASTER OF JUNE, 1940, put a stop to all French literary production for several months. When, in the autumn and at the beginning of 1941, publishing houses, reviews and journals gradually became active once more, it was apparent that literature was divided into two camps: that of the occupied zone and that of the unoccupied. Apart from the prisoners of war—*e. g.*, Sartre, a young writer of great promise, Pierre Bost, etc.—and the "emigrés" (Romains, Maurois, Bernanos, Breton, Maritain, who are now in the United States), the majority of writers preferred to remain in the "free" zone. Some, like Duhamel, Mauriac, Daudet, Giraudoux, retired to the country; others settled on the côte d'Azur: Gide, du Gard, Malraux, Aragon. Paul Morand, de Lacretelle, Claudel, Montherlant and the Tharaud brothers were members of a third group which went to Vichy, Lyons or Marseilles. Of those who remained in or returned to Paris, there were two categories: those who submitted to the change of events—Pierre Benoit, M. Aymé, Eluard, and those who professed to pro-fascist sentiments and the intention to collaborate with the invaders—Drieu la Rochelle, Céline, Chardonne, José Germain, Ramon Fernandez.

The most important event was the return to Paris of all the big publishers who had fled in June, 1940. The first was Grasset, who immediately began negotiations with the Germans for the resumption of his activities. A little later other publishers were authorized to return to their work: La Nouvelle Revue Française (Gallimard), Plon, Flammarion, Fayard, Stock, Payot. Jewish houses, such as Calmann-Lévy and Ferenzi, were closed. The German authorities made an index of forbidden books and authors; Gestapo agents made the rounds of all the publishing houses, and confiscated all suspicious works. Since the distribution of paper and pre-publication censorship of all manuscripts are entirely in the hands of the Germans, the Parisian publishers find themselves completely at the mercy of the Nazis.

Certain publishers immediately declared themselves to be partisans of the New Order. Grasset published his pamphlet, "A la Recherche de la France" ("In Search of France"), in which he cleared the way for the conqueror, and assembled around his firm all those who pronounced themselves to be for collaboration with Germany. No less significant was the about-face of Gallimard, director of La Nouvelle Revue Française. The directorship of the Revue, which formerly represented the vanguard of artistic and political movements, changed hands: instead of Jean Paulhan, it was entrusted to Drieu La Rochelle, who has nominated himself the ideologist of French fascism. He also directs the review, La Gerbe (The Sheaf), around which gather those literati who are partisans of "collaboration within the framework of a unified and hierarchical Europe under the shield of the Reich."

In unoccupied France, publishers are rare; there are only Aubanel, Arthaud (Grenoble) and some small houses in the provinces (Avignon, Marseilles and Lyons). On the other hand, reviews and journals are quite numerous: the old, conservative Revue de Deux Mondes comes out in Clermont-Ferrand and continues to publish novels, historical studies and essays, the authors of which are on their honor not to make any allusion to the present. La Revue Universelle is published in Vichy by Henri Massis, one of the theoreticians of the right and a friend of Marshal Pétain. His collaborators are Charles Maurras, the ideologist of French monarchism, Thierry Maulnier and other members of the Action Française group. In Lyons, the Catholics publish the monthly review, Cité Nouvelle, which, while supporting Pétain's "national revolution," seems at times to show something of an independent intellectual spirit. In Marseilles, Jean Ballard continues with Les Cahiers du Sud (Notebooks of the South) which have become the poet's refuge. Other poetical reviews appear in Avignon and in Algiers (Fontaine). The two big Parisian weeklies, Candide and Gringoire, also appear in the free zone. Gringoire is published in Marseilles; its circulation exceeds a half-million. This militant fascist organ attacks the English through the reactionary pamphlets of its principal contributor, Henri Béraud, and releases anti-Semitic, anti-democratic and pro-Nazi propaganda worthy of the best pupils of Dr. Goebbels. Candide is more moderate—it is intended for those who have accepted the Vichy government but cannot yet see the Germans as the saviors of the world in general and of France in particular.

Since last summer, literary exchange between the two zones has become more lively. The Germans do not allow books and reviews published in the free territory to penetrate the occupied, but they do permit exportation of all material printed in Paris to unoccupied France. What is more, certain writers succeed in traveling back and forth between the two sections of the country, and thus keep up contacts with their scattered friends.

If one examines the ensemble of French literary production from the two zones, one notices that, while it is far from prolific, it deals almost exclusively with current events. After the invasion many writers, lacking a sense of decency, set about knocking the regime that had just fallen. Such, for instance, is Céline's latest work, "Les Beaux Draps" ("The Fine Mess") which closely follows his anti-Semitic, pornographic, Hitleristic novel, "Les Bagatelles pour un Mas-

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sacre" ("Trifles for a Massacre"). Others have made retrospective criticism; former minister Anatole de Monzie's "Journal"; Fabre Luce's "Journal de France," which is trying to lay the cornerstone for French Nazism; or, "Chronique de l'An Quarante" ("Chronicle of 1940"), by Jacques Chardonne, a novelist of the psychological school who wants to become a moralist and who recommends submission and collaboration.

Which fundamental vices led France to disaster? That is the question writers in France ask today. It is answered only by those authorized to speak because their opinions are pleasing to the Germans as well as to the Vichy government. Consequently, we have the books of Charles Maurras, "La Seule France" ("The Only France"), where he preaches the return to the virtues of the monarchy; of H. Massis, "Les Idées Restent" ("The Ideas Remain"), who tries to reconcile corporatism, fascism and catholicism; of G. Suarez, "Pétain ou Democratie: Il Faut Choisir" ("Pétain or Democracy: We Must Choose"), whose title explains the content; Plon's entire series, "Cahiers de l'Unité Française" ("Notebooks on French Unity"), or Grasset's collection, "A la Recherche de la France." The best specimen is the Drieu La Rochelle, "Ne Plus Attendre" ("Wait No Longer"). Here the author advises the French people to admit England's defeat and Germany's victory, to become gay again and not to hesitate in supporting Hitler.

Benoist Mechin, Undersecretary of State in Vichy, comes to the same conclusions in his book, "La Moisson de Quarante" ("The Harvest of 1940"). He is also author of a "Diary of a Prisoner of War" in which he tells, among other things, how the Germans freed him from Camp Stalag as soon as they learned that he was the same Benoist Mechin who long before the war had upheld the necessity for an understanding with the Reich. But those who remain war prisoners do not seem to share M. Mechin's opinions. They are animated by a bitter and revolutionary spirit, as is shown in M. Betz's "Dialogues des Prisonniers."

Books on the war are not numerous and lack literary quality. They are mostly reporting: *e. g.*, "Ceux de Quarante" ("Those of Forty"), by R. Dorgelès; "Combat Sans Gloire," by G. Gaudy, "Les 26 Hommes," the story of a motorcycle unit, by Jean de Baroncelli.

A very marked tendency in the literature of today is that which is called "the search for eminently French ideas." Some invite their readers to draw upon the source of Charles Péguy, poet and Catholic thinker of the pre-1914 era, and cite his words: "All the savagery of the world is not worth one honest, modest, ordered, beautiful French garden." Others try to define the character and the mentality of the nation and to extricate its eternal elements. The most interesting of these works is certainly that published by Flammarion, "La France et la Civilisation Moderne," in which there is a remarkable essay by Paul Valéry. Here Valéry declares that "the taste for abstraction and its realization into a formula" is the typical trait of the French mind.

Such subtlety is not desired by the Vichy group. Their official propaganda proclaims that Frenchmen should simply return to the "qualities of the old provinces of the country," or preaches the necessity of France's becoming an agricultural nation once more. The slogan, "Return to the soil," has paved the way for a series of publications lauding country life; all this "approved" literature lacks artistic taste, except Jean Gazave's novel, "Romain Alpuech." By some strange quirk of chance, this was the first French novel to appear after the armistice. It is, however, hardly apt to raise agricultural enthusiasm or serve the goal of official propaganda, being a harsh picture of peasant life.

What is more, with the "return to the soil in the old French tradition" (the seventeenth century is especially in vogue), the Germans in Paris and their friends in Vichy urge that literature "become sane and banish immorality" and leave the "psychological complications common to the Jewish, Freudian style." Second-rate novelists took this command seriously and hurriedly wrote flat and colorless works with evaporated heroines and noble heroes who seem to step out of last century's melodramas. Reviews and journals are flooded with serials of this nature, and even Figaro, a conservative Catholic paper, published in Lyons, pokes fun at them, saying that literature is "returning to the healthy traditions of Georges Ohnet [a petit-bourgeois novelist of the end of the last century] and Henri Bordeaux [the 'proper' author of books for young society girls]."

As for the better known writers, they continue to publish works which bring out no change either in their ideas or in their manner of presentation. To read them, one would say that nothing, absolutely nothing, had happened to France and to the world. François Mauriac, in his "Parisienne," follows the complicated labyrinth of a feminine soul in torment. Colette in her beautiful short stories, "Chambre d'Hotel" and in her novel, "Julie de Carneilhan"—which is a curious picture of a "free," very Parisian woman—brings out the well known *mélange* of cynicism and sentimentality. Paul Morand tries to give "the atmosphere of the twentieth century" in "L'Homme Pressé." P. Benoit, in "Désert de Gobi" (A. Michel), J. Peyré in "Himalaya" and A. Demaison in "Latitudes" (Arthaud), pay tribute to the romantic literature of exotic adventure which was always very popular in France. In "Le Roi d'Écosse," La Varende continues his passionate, historical work. E. Peisson in "Cachalot" and R. Vercel in the collection of short stories, "La Clandestine," remain true to their type: tales of the sea and of love. Georges Duhamel writes philosophical short stories, in the style of his "Fables de Mon Jardin," which are stamped with a soft, melancholy wisdom. Jean Giono exalts nature's forces and the spontaneous feelings of his native Provence, and announces that his next novels will be published in Algiers. He has also written a fine study of Melville which has just appeared in Paris in a beautiful edition of "Moby Dick."

Among the other works which came out up to October of this year, we should note "Maono de Finlande," by Crottet, a story of a Nordic reindeer in the style of Curwood; Troyat's short stories, "Jugement de Dieu"; two novels with mystic leanings, "La Jambe Noire," by Ghéon, which tells of the conversion of a Roman patrician, and "Varouna," by Julian Green, which deals with the problem of metempsychosis. All these works appeared in Paris. In Nice, Francis Carco published a moving portrait of the capital, "Nostalgie de Paris."

Many names are missing from this review of French literary production during the past year. This is not surprising: certain writers believe that with the double censor of Berlin and Vichy weighing France down, only one thing remains for them—silence.

MARC SLONIM

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The Spurious Craving

Atrocity Propaganda 1914-1919, by James Morgan Read. Yale University Press. 319 pages. $3.50.

IN ANY STATE OF CONFLICT, whether personal or international, the enemy is apt to be viewed in the guise of a monster. His monstrosity, in fact, is an essential requirement, not only to justify an excess of retaliation, but to establish us as having been unassailably in the right. In the case of a personal encounter the effect of offense is so direct that it provokes immediate resentment. A man whose toe has been ruthlessly trodden upon has no need to have his wrath aroused by being told that his assailant hails from a land of toe-trampling barbarians.

However, in the encounter between nations the foe has the contradictory aspect of being, collectively, vicious and dangerous, and, individually, one of a mass of little men who, like us, are only doing their duty. One method of combating the disastrous consequences of viewing only the one, human side of the picture is to destroy it altogether. This is the function of atrocity propaganda.

It is rather important here to stress the difference between atrocity and atrocity propaganda. An edict may be atrocious, the whole policy of a nation at war or at peace may be atrocious, and may constitute the vital issue that determines war. But it is tenable at the same time that the members of that nation that comprise its fighting force, far from being blood-lusting monsters, are so abjectly docile that they dare not disobey orders. Atrocity propaganda, on the other hand, aims to shift the responsibility for a discreditable policy from the realm of an abstract administration to the innate brutality and aggressiveness of the national character, and hence of the individuals to be met in battle.

Mr. Read has presented an excellent and comprehensive summary of the lines of approach adopted by all parties during the last world war. He notes first of all the rather obvious motives and methods of atrocity propaganda, and then proceeds with a detailed account of the outbreak of horror stories that followed swiftly upon the German invasion of Belgium. The stories were of two kinds. First, the accusation launched on all sides of atrocities resulting from breaches of international law, such as the use of dum-dum bullets; second, the harrowing tales of gouged-out eyes and chopped-off hands—stories that ran from mouth to mouth and eventually found their way into the press. He reports the stories faithfully, giving contemporary references and accounts of the work undertaken by commissions appointed to track them down and examine into their veracity. From the piecing together of the available material there is no evidence to support a single tale of crucified soldiers, mutilated women and children, or savage attacks upon the wounded. Mr. Read makes no denial of atrocities having been committed in isolated cases; indeed he points out that the confusion of war offers opportunities to unbalanced people for the exercise of perversion impossible under the restrictions of normal life. He does assert, however, that even the most fantastic myths, while not officially countenanced, were covertly played up. By quotations from diaries and letters he gives some idea of the telling quality of such news relayed at high pressure. For instance, on September 23, 1914, Lord Bertie, British Ambassador to France, wrote: "Of course, each side will accuse the other of brutalities and atrocities. There is nothing that people will not believe or invent." Two months later: "I began by not believing in German atrocities, and now I feel that I myself would, if I could, kill every combatant German. . . ."

More lasting in effect than the content of the stories was the fact that they were ever perpetrated. At the time they served the quick purpose of arousing action through moral indignation and hatred born of fear. They lingered on, however, long after the war was ended in a series of bitter recriminations and bickerings.

On the whole, the atrocity propaganda on the Allied side was the more competent, chiefly because it took the offensive without drawing breath to repudiate the charges laid by the Germans. The Germans, too, had their quota of "unmentionable horrors," but they blunted the edge of their accusations by their "Es ist nicht wahr!" campaign. "Among the real atrocities for which the Germans are responsible," wrote Frederick William Wyle, "is their mania for self-defensive manifestoes."

In order to sway the sympathies of neutral countries, both sides sought to utilize every incident that might demonstrate the righteousness of their cause in the face of unexampled barbarism. Scrupulousness was not a conspicuous characteristic of either party, but the Germans placed an almost superstitious reliance on the universal acceptance of the letter of the law. Thus they played into the hands of their atrocity-mongering opponents by their strict adherence to legal severities, of which the shooting of Nurse Cavell was the most notorious.

A fundamental flaw hitherto overlooked by the advocates of atrocity propaganda is their tacit admission that the cause for which battle is waged is not strong enough to stand on its own merits, but needs added bolstering. Another factor that has been underestimated is that although people under the spell of terror may become pliable, they also become weak. In recent years these two salient points have been grasped and applied in different ways by totalitarian and democratic leaders respectively.

It may be said that Hitler has terrorized his own people, but it is worth noting that he has not terrorized them with accounts of the brutal strength of their opponents. Rather he has bought their submission with the promise of protection afforded by *his* brutal strength which, in the course of the transaction, is transmitted to them. The opponents are presented not as savage barbarians, that is, objects of fear, but as flabby decadents, objects of contempt. He has completed the circle by reversing the process.

Valid material for atrocity propaganda has never been so abundant as in the years following Hitler's seizure of power. The material has been neither suppressed in order to keep up an appearance of friendly relations, nor exploited to jockey the people of one nation into a state of manufactured hostility against the people of another. In 1914 mischievous legends of the racial inferiority of the adversary, disseminated by means of atrocity propaganda, led to the synonymous usage of the words "German" and "barbarian." We have learned since that fascism surpasses in evil any outrage purportedly committed by a given individual of a foreign nation. The spurious craving for vengeance against a race has been supplanted by a genuine determination to abolish a destructive creed.

EILEEN HOLDING

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Interior, with Figures

Hotel Splendide, by Ludwig Bemelmans. New York: The Viking Press. 192 pages. $2.50.

LUDWIG BEMELMANS' Hotel Splendide is already part of legend, having as its appeal to readers not only the how-it-was-done of the professional man recollecting in tranquility, but the strange and delightful characters it is Bemelmans' apparent duty to know or to dream up in some equitable patchwork of the real and the imagined. His new book continues the line of figures in the gallery, and is much better pulled together than the isolated sketches preceding it in The New Yorker. The great black African of one of the profiles, for example, stretches to more chapters in the book, and the incompetent waiter, Mespoullets, advances into a figure of mean tragedy and finally of terror. The last chapter of the book and the last of Mespoullets is one of the best stories of fear and the unseen criminal that have been written; it points to the chance that Bemelmans will not run dry of things to remember, because he has the novelist's touch of multiplying and creating.

His facts read as brightly as fiction, and I believe by now that many of them are. In clarity of scene and character, he has always been a story-writer at heart, and this—as well as his sharp painter's eye—explains the success of his seeming artlessness. In truth he is a careful artist, and until he gets sick of that hotel of his, he can people it infinitely with as many out-of-focus and into-the-heart people as, say, Dickens. Nobody ever met an actual Dickens or Bemelmans character; yet everyone would like to and somehow believes he might. For what happens really is that the final result is Dickens or Bemelmans, seeing one person or several of a type, and filtering all through a wonderful and distorted glass, partly clouded with the image of the writer.

In the book there are all sorts of typical adventures, how he got a Hispano-Suiza, a valet, an ebony-black chauffeur who was splendid in uniform but never learned to drive; how he lived like an emperor upstairs in the Splendide through an oversight and the stubborn aplomb of his valet; how the suite deteriorated into a pressing-and-cleaning establishment through the same offices; and how as the end of that idyll he was caught in bed there one morning by the manager and his retinue, unsuspectingly bowing in three prospective lady tenants. You will probably remember the enormously rich, fat and mean old fright: "The maître d'hotel pulled Monsieur's chair out. Monsieur pulled out Madame's chair. Madame produced the dog from her generous lap—it had slept there under a fold of the tablecloth while she ate—and gave the dog to Monsieur, who placed it on the carpet. Then the maître d'hotel, taking steps as small as Madame's, escorted her out, walking on her left side and talking to her solicitously, his face close to hers. Monsieur followed about six feet behind, with a big Belinda Fancy Tales cigar between his teeth, his hands in his pockets, and the leash of the dog slipped over one wrist. . . . She looked like several pieces of comfortable furniture piled together under a velvet cover and being slowly pushed along on little wheels." He drew her that way, and instead of getting fired, got a day off to make several copies for M. Victor and his harried colleagues in other famous and likewise frequented hotels.

There are some pieces in the book less delicious—"The Banquet," "The Dreams of the Magician"—but the level is high, the subjects are fresh and varied as ever, and the overall impression, no doubt helped by the fifteen drawings, is as though some special warmth of heart had let you see a whole façade of gargoyles as living, human and quite to be expected. OTIS FERGUSON

A Reader's List

FOUNDING FATHERS, by Kenneth B. Umbreit (Harpers, $3.50). Like the author's previous book, "Our Eleven Chief Justices," this is a bibliographical potpourri, compounded of homely details and critical judgments. The founding fathers discussed are Jefferson, John and Samuel Adams, John Hancock, Patrick Henry and Washington. Valuable chiefly because no great biographies exist of any of them thus far, and also because Mr. Umbreit has relied more upon the journals and correspondence of the men than upon the secondary material.

FREE YUGOSLAVIA CALLING, by Dr. Svetislav-Sveta Petrovitch (Greystone, $3). The Paul Revere of the Balkans, Dr. Petrovitch, is now broadcasting anti-Nazi messages from Boston to Yugoslavia. His account of Hitler's march through Czecho-Slovakia and Poland into Yugoslavia is a bitter, angry story of treachery and intrigue. You can add this Balkan country to the French, the Czechs, the Poles and the other peoples of Europe who will dig Hitler's grave and lower him into it.

ROD OF IRON: The Absolute Rulers of England, by Milton Waldman (Houghton Mifflin, $3.50). Vivid and well informed story of the dictatorship which ruled England almost continuously for 150 years, in terms of the role and personality of its three most successful exponents, Henry VIII, Elizabeth and Cromwell, together with a portrait of King John, an earlier freak and failure. Warmly recommended to the general reader.

DEMOCRATIC FRANCE: The Third Republic from Sedan (1871) to Vichy (1940), by Richard Walden Hale Jr. (Coward-McCann, $3.50). On the whole, a pedestrian book, intended to show the average American what France was like during the seventy years she was a democracy, dealing with constitutional, institutional and industrial stages in her development. Commendable effort to see the French as they saw themselves, particularly through the operation of their Parliament. Regarding France's recent defeat, the author emphasizes Germany's superior preparation for industrialized war.

THE MAN ON MY BACK, by Eric Linklater (Macmillan, $3). Linklater's autobiography. Recollections of an Orkney Islands boyhood, service in the First World War, university life in Scotland and jobs and travels in many parts of the world set down in first-rate prose. Not an "important" life; just some of the year's best reading.

WILL ROGERS: His Wife's Story, by Betty Rogers (Bobbs-Merrill, $2.75). Mild biography of the shrewd, restless Oklahoma cowboy who kidded and ad-libbed his way to the top in show business and journalism. Mrs. Rogers writes simply and, for a wife, quite sensibly about her husband's homely ways and the casual development of a uniquely American career. Well peppered with typical Rogers commentary.

WINTER IN VERMONT, by Charles Edward Crane (Knopf, $3.50). Informal essays on the cozy side of winter in Ver-

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mont. Mr. Crane tackles everything from birds to blizzards with genuine interest but in a style which only grandma might have thought lively. The pieces on winter sports are disappointing fillers from the publicity barrel. Nearly a hundred photographs, most of them very good.

AIR BASE, by Boone T. Guyton (Whittlesey, $2.50). Experiences in service of one of the pilot officers the navy trains in four years and holds on the Reserve list to make room for more. Informative and even heartening in its detailed picture of a thorough seasoning process. In the frequent stretches of human interest, not very interesting.

A LADY GOES TO HOLLYWOOD, by Helen Partridge (Macmillan, $2). The wife of a sudden best-seller with his first movie contract accompanies him to Hollywood and reports the town in letters to her friends (who collected them into a book, to her "amazement"—possibly because they are all about chapter-length and book-style in the first place). Some good common sense, some information, some misinformative gossip. All right if you can stand lady authors who find color in exclamation points, the words "tummy" and "scrumptious," things to be "ahed and ohed over" and "just too dear for words."

L. BAXTER, MEDICUS, by Knud Stouman (Greystone, $2.75). Something off the beaten track in historical fiction: a quiet novel based on the professional and emotional problems of a young physician in seventeenth-century New York. He studies abroad with Leeuwenhoek and Sydenham and performs the first autopsy in America. It's nice to meet a hero who advances on the Indians with inoculations for smallpox instead of deadly marksmanship.

CAESAR STAGG, by George Cronyn (Greystone, $2.50). A light novel about a political boss who makes mayors, governors, senators and ward-heelers and takes what he wants when he wants. The writing is breezy, the characters breezier, and the whole thing amusing for its reflex retorts.

THE ANCHORED HEART, by Ida Treat (Harcourt, Brace, $2.50). A small Brittany island before and after the German occupation. The author, an American woman, had made her home there; the fishermen's wives were her friends, the French lads who never got a chance to fight were her guests, the bombs were heading straight for her gray roof. A warmly personal and quite satisfactory account of a piece of history that so far has been almost exclusively in the newspaper files.

Contributors

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RALPH BATES is the author, among other books, of "Lean Men," "The Olive Field" and "Fields of Paradise."

MARC SLONIM is a Russian writer and lecturer, the author of fourteen books on Russian literature, history and politics. After living in Prague and Paris, he came to this country last September via Dakar, a Casablancan concentration camp and Spain.

EILEEN HOLDING, an English artist, has written for the English weeklies. She came to this country in 1937 and taught for a year at the Chicago School of Design.

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

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